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INTRODUCTION 
In the past 25 years the Colombian economy has suffered substanti, 
changes in the level and 'structure of exports. The purpose of this 
study is to examine the economic policies which made this situation 
possible, from a selective perspective' that highlights what we consider 
the salient features of this experience. 
In 1952, Colombia exported virtually only two commodities (coffee 
and petroleum) whose growth was not dynamic and whose values were 
highly unstable; i ts trade and financial policy was also scarcely 
open to other countries. In 1976, Colombia presents a diversified 
structure of exports which imprint their high rate of growth on the 
rest of the economy, have greatly reduced the instability deriving 
from the external sector and have permitted a degree of openness to 
other countries, taking advantage of the gains resulting from 
international economic interaction. The future of exports seems 
assured because of the importance assigned to them in the country's 
development strategy» In fact, according to a Congress report, the 
President of Colombia has stated that a great ef fort wil l be made 
!,to make Colombia once again the Japan of South America11 and "exports 
the prime mover of our economic development".1/ 
Colombia has diversified i ts exports. In the period 1952-1955? 
exports of coffee averaged 83 per cent of the total, and coffee and 
petroleum together represented 94 per cent of Colombia's total exports. 
In 1975» coffee accounted for less than 50 per cent of Colombia's 
sales abroad. '' 
Minor exports, particularly manufactures and semi-manufactures, 
have increased significantly. In 1952-1955, Colombia exported 
510 million dollars' worth annually (at 1970 prices), of which 
430 million dollars were "major" exports (94 per cent) and only 
1/ Alfonso Lópea Michelsen, "Informe Presidencial sobre le Estado 
de Emergencia Económica", Anales del Congreso, 25 November 1974. 
/30 million 
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30 million dollars were "minor" exports (6 per cent);l/ of these, 
exports of manufactures represented only 3«5 million dollars« In 
1974, Colombia's sales abroad amounted to 820 million dollars (at 
1970 prices), of which minor exports accounted for 310 million 
dollars (38 per cent); of these, exports of manufactures totalled 
200 million dollars, or 24 per cent of the total, while they absorbed 
64 per cent of minor exports» :It is also interesting to note that 
world inflation .has sharply increased the value of Colombian exports 
in dollars at current prices,., which in 1975 stood at over 
1,400 million dollr.rs, .with coffee accounting for 4-7 per cent» 
The growth of minor exports indicates the trend of total 
exports, while coffee exports account for its fluctuations. Between 
1952-1953 and 1974, minor exports ;grew, in real terms, at an average 
annual rate of 14.2 per cent, major exports by only 0.5 per cent 
and total exports by 2.6 per cent. 
The proportion of domestic industrial supply exported, has. also 
increased significantly. In 1952 it was a negligible figure. It 
was not until the end of the 1960s that it began to increase, -.rising 
from 1.7 per cent in 1967 to 6,8 per cent in 1973» 
Another salient feature is the marked diversification that has 
taken place by market of destination. In 1952, the United States 
absorbed 80 per cent of Colombia's exports, while sales to the countries 
now members of the Andean Agreement were amounted to less than 1 million 
dollars. In 1975» exports to the United States represented only 33 per 
cent of the .total, while the countries of the Andean Group purchased 
nearly 180 million dollars' worth of Colombian products, . 
It may well be asked what specific policies are responsible for 
this drastic change in the level and structure of Colombian exports? 
What form have the various policies taken in the four phases.that may 
1/ These terms are used for Colombia for the whole period, but with 
changing definitions of the components of each. In this study, 
exports of coffee, petroleum and petroleum products and precious 
stones, are called "major" exports, and the rest "minor" exports. 
This is the most important classification in terms of export 
promotion policy, as will be seen later. 
/be distinguished 
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be distinguished in Colombia's export promotion policy? What are 
the costs and benefits of the different policies and how can they be 
compared? How can an overall policy be formulated in consonance with 
the country's development strategy? 
These are some of the questions \se are trying to answer in this 
study» It is not intended to be a comprehensive and systematic study 
of the subject, but is merely an attempt to analyse certain crucial 
aspects of Colombia's experience, with a view to providing some 
criteria which may be useful in the formulation and implementation of 
export promotion policies that may be adopted by the countries of the 
region. 
The conceptual framework of the analysis is explained in the 
document accompanying this study,1/ and the first chapter of this 
study summarizes, with reference to the Colombian case, the main 
analytical criteria that will be used. The evolution of exports 
- in terms of volume and unit values - and their diversification at 
the level of commodities and markets are discussed in the second chapter. 
In the third chapter, the export promotion policy instruments used in 
Colombia are described and evaluated. Four phases in export promotion 
policy may be distinguished between 19^9 and 1976, and the effects of 
the various promotion mechanisms - which are the central policies, 
what do they promote, how rapidly, at what fiscal cost - are discussed 
within the context of the overall promotion policy characterizing 
each phase, A final chapter containes some elements for an overall 
appraisal of export promotion policy, such as quantitative information 
on the use of the various instruments, the total level of export 
incentives provided, and the impact of the promotion system on the 
allocation of resources, employment and income distribution. Lastly, 
some comments are made on the salient features of the Colombian 
experience. 
1/ Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and José Piñera, Políticas de promoción 
de exportaciones, en jpaî seŝ  en desarrollo Ts^TCEPAL/Conf .59/L. 2), 





CRITERIA OF ANALYSIS 1/ 
The strategy for the development of minor exports has helped 
overcome some of the most serious problems of . the Colombian economy, 
such as the chronic shortage of outside resources, excessive 
f luctuations in i t s export income, the deterioration of the terms of 
trade and the smallness of the'domestic market with i t s consequent 
unfavourable e f f e c t on the e f f i c i ency of industrial development<> 
Although the f i r s t steps in export promotion policy iirere made 
at the beginning of the 1950s, i t was only in 1967 that a start was 
made in applying a true strategy for the development of exports and a 
set of po l i c i es to encourage minor exports was implemented more 
resolutely than before» After the i n i t i a l impulse, however, doubts 
have arisen about the cost of such po l ic ies , the signif icance of 
their benef i ts obtained and the way in which both the costs and the 
benef i ts should be distributed» I t has furthermore been noted that 
the international markets for some export products suf fer from defects 
which make i t d i f f i c u l t to secure a major increase in Colombian sales 
abroad. 
These considerations indicate that the promotion of exports 
must not be based on the pro l i f e rat ion of every kind of incentive 
without taking into account the f i s ca l cost and the repercussions on 
the rest of the economy, nor should i t consist solely of the mere 
manipulation of exchange po l icy . A strategy designed to contribute 
to the integral development of the national economy ca l l s for a more 
elaborate approach to export promotion pol icy. This must be based on 
an examination of the ro le to be played by exports in the national 
economy, the object ives to which exports are to be subordinated, and 
the most e f f e c t i v e tools and mechanisms for achieving this , in this 
1/ This chapter i s a summary, with reference to the Colombian case, 
of chapters I and I I of the document by R. Ffrench-Davis and 
J. Pinera already c i ted. 
/chapter the 
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chapter the foundations and objectives of policies for the promotion 
of minor exports are discussed, with reference to the Colombian case. 
Furthermore, three categories of policies for the promotion of minor 
exports are distinguished from a conceptual point of view: equalizing 
and compensatory policies, negotiation policies; and incentive policies» 
1. Targets^of the promotion policy 
Many Latin American countries, including Colombia, made 
intensive efforts during several decades to substitute imports. , In 
recent years, a critical view of this process, has become .more ; r . • 
widespread which considers that, although necessary, it phould be 
guided to a greater extent by considerations of the efficient allocation 
of resources and should therefore assume a more, selective nature and 
involve greater vertical integration in certain sectors. The criticisms 
of the form and intensity assumed by import substitution arose 
simultaneously with observation of the fact that the continued advance 
of this process within the limits of national markets was running into 
increasing limitations. The combination of these two circumstances has 
gradually increased the concern to promote the growth of exports. 
It would therefore appear that this phenomenon gives rise to a 
very clear distinction between import substitution and export promotion. 
In reality, however, this is only so in certain circumstances, depending 
on the policy instruments used. Thus, a substitution policy operating 
under.excessive protection cuts off the national market from the 
external market and discriminates against production for export by 
leading to over-valued exchange rates and by giving a level of 
protection which effectively militates against exports using imported 
inputs. 
Import substitution, however, often constitutes a prior step to 
the development of new exports for which the domestic market serves as 
a supporting base. This substitution (which lessens the uncertainty 
for the domestic producer of entering into new markets) is particularly 
important in the case of exports of manufactures which are not based 
on the exploitation of high-productivity natural resources, and in the 
/case of 
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case of the newly-established, activities which require a trial period 
in order to reduce the costs of production» Integration processes 
expand the markets in which import substitution can be carried on» 
One of the main elements of this process of regional import 
substitution is the expansion of the exports of each member country 
to the markets of the other participating nations» These exports, 
directed towards markets with a degree of development similar to that 
of the exporting country, can constitute an immediate stage of learning 
and improvement for the subsequent pursuit of markets in the 
industrialized countries which are more difficult to reach but which 
are also much wider. 
The expansion of exports, just like import substitution before 
it, is not an objective in itself. Consequently, exports should be 
promoted to the extent that they contribute to national development 
and to the achievement of economic strategy targets. Because of the 
wide range of products which are capable of being exported, the 
category or characteristics selected for promotion will depend on the 
objectives pursued through the development of exports. 
Changes in the level and composition of exports can have 
numerous effects on the national economy. Thus, for example, they can 
affect the balance-of-payments position and its stability, they can 
have different levels of impact in different sectors of production, 
they can affect the fiscal budget, the operation of the monetary 
policy, the level of employment and income distribution. The capacity 
of export policy to bring about a given effect on each of these aspects 
is very disparate, however. While the effect on the balance of 
payments can be direct and intense, the effect on income distribution 
will be of a more indirect and gradual nature» 
The conclusion can be drawn from the foregoing that the export 
policy should be aimed to achieve those objectives where it has 
greatest influence. This does not mean that its other repercussions 
should be ignored, however. Even though such aspects as better income 
distribution and balancing of the budget are not objectives of an 
/export development 
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export development pol icy, in a developing country they should 
nevertheless condition the selection of tools and mechanisms to be 
used in such a po l icy . The greater a country's d i f f i c u l t y in achieving 
other object ives, the more the freedom of action for using a particular 
instrument to comply with a spec i f ic object ive must be subject to 
s t r i c t conditions. The budgetary situation and income distr ibution are 
part icularly d i f f i c u l t areas. 
Three object ives of the Colombian economic pol icy to which an. 
export pol icy can contribute s ign i f i cant ly may be distinguished: 
e f f i c i ency in overcoming external restr ic t ions, d i ve rs i f i ca t i on of 
exports, and increasing the contribution of manufacturing to national 
development. 
(a ) E f f ic iency in overcoming external restr ic t ions ' 
I t i s we11 known that the shortage of external, resources required 
to cover the imports v i t a l l y needed for the process of growth and for 
sat is fy ing basic consumption i s one of the most recurrent problems 
which has a f f l i c t e d Colombian economic development. .Basically, these 
resources can be obtained in three ways: by generating greater exports, 
by intensi fy ing the process of import substitution, or by receiving 
net inflows of foreign capital through an increase in external 
indebtedness or new foreign investment. I f there i s a growing d e f i c i t 
on the real part-of-the : external sector (exports and imports of..goods 
and serv ices ) , however, this cannot be compensated inde f in i t e l y through 
inflows of foreign capi ta l . In order to maintain i t s independence of 
action, the country must therefore obtain the necessary external 
resources for its :development by generating new foreign exchange income 
through increased exports and/or by f ree ing greater resources through 
import substitution» 
An external sector strategy which aims to maximize the growth of 
the country's real.income should aim to al locate resources in such a 
way that, when evaluated at social__prices, the cost in terms of real > 
resources of generating new foreign exchange income through greater 
exports i s similar to that of freeing additional fore ign exchange 
resources by substituting imports with national products. This i s 
/the classic 
the classic condition for e f f i c i ency in the al locat ion of resources 
in the external sector which seeks to eliminate the bottlenecks in 
this sector as e f f e c t i v e l y as possible,. 
A factor which w i l l have a determining influence in the selection 
of the emphasis to be given to either of these two ways of improving 
the ava i l ab i l i t y of foreign exchange i s the signi f icance assumed in 
new investments or in the expansion of the existing investments by 
economies of scale, which give r i se to an increasing need to resort 
to external markets as the industr ial izat ion process proceeds, 
especial ly as the national economy i s small in s ize« 
Another important aspect i s the degree of access ib i l i ty of 
foreign markets.. I t should not be overlooked that import 
substitution provides a protected market which cannot be inter fered 
with by the actions of other countries, and that integration and trade 
agreements provide a broader market than the domestic one and promote 
the exports of each part ic ipating country in a context of trade with 
negotiated access. 
(b ) Divers i f i cat ion of exports 
• itiii 1 , . n , iTrttf1 )»ii • iw i i nun i mi i i 'i i i i uscaag"—«•aagj-aaxjatMOBaca» 
The ins tab i l i t y of export income i s a striking feature of the 
Colombian external sector which has been closely linked with the 
importance of co f f e e and the f luctuations in i t s pr ice. This 
ins tab i l i t y can lead to both po l i t i ca l and economic d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
; On the one hand, the balance-of-payments crises often caused 
by f luctuations in export income, with a l l their implications for the 
proper supply of essential products and for the l eve l of domestic 
economic ac t i v i t y , represent a source of po l i t i c a l ins tab i l i t y . On 
the other hand, can be argued that the ins tab i l i t y of the export 
sector has given r i se to a substantial economic cost for the Colombian 
economy since i t has prevented the establishment of a stable trend of 
capital formation; i t has hindered the normal process of planning both 
at the central l e ve l and at the l eve l of productive a c t i v i t i e s ; i t has 
led to the f a i lu re of attempts to rat ional ize foreign trade and i t has 
/given r i se 
given rise to great difficulties in domestic mechanisms for adjusting 
to such fluctuations, which has very often given an impulse to the 
inflationary process. 
The costs of instability manifest themselves at three different 
levels: directly at the levels of the exporting and producing 
enterprise and of the balance of payments, and indirectly through the 
transmission to the domestic economy of the adjustments linked with 
the balance-of-paymeilts situation» In order to solve the problems 
which arise there are two complementary approaches: the first is to 
seek ways of reducing the cost of instability and the second is to 
try to diminish their,causes directly» 
The cost of instability may be reduced through international 
reserve policies and through machinery for short-term external 
financing; the latter solution may involve both the use of the internal 
finance market and the establishment by governments and multilateral 
institutions of compensation funds ana financial safety nets. In this 
way it is possible to reduce the transmission into the economy of the 
fluctuations in the balance-of-payments position; this may also involve 
the establishment of- the price in national currency collected by the 
exporter. ' The first approach means that the exchange authorities 
using their foreign currency reserves, apply a compensatory policy 
which prevents the price fluctuations of major exports from affecting 
the conditions in which the rest of exporting and importing activities 
take place; under the second approach the economic authorities also 
compensate the exporter for the fluctuations in prices, with the 
consequent repercussions on the monetary and fiscal situations. 
The instability originating in the export sector can be reduced 
basically through the diversification of products and markets. The 
first aspect calls for the preferential promotion of the export of 
those goods (or groups of goods) which provide the least unstable 
income. The second can be achieved by granting stimuli to exports 
directed to new markets. A third alternative, which unavoidably 
requires the participation of other countries, is that of stabilizing 
/international prices 
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international prices through the regulation of markets by producers 
and/or consumers» The successive international coffee agreements 
are a noteworthy effort in this respect» 
The price of coffee suffers great fluctuations caused by abrupt 
changes in supply which is very much affected- by climatic conditions. 
The price fluctuations are amplified by the inelasticity of the short-
term supply and demand for coffee, which not only creates difficulties 
in the development of the branches of production directly affected, 
but are also transmitted, mainly through their repercussions on the 
balance of payments, to -all national activities connected with the 
external sector-. It should pe. noted .that since the fluctuation in 
the supply of Brazilian .coffee is the main cause of the variations 
-in. the price of this product, it has been the demand (or excess 
demand) for Colombian coffee which has frequently been passed on and 
has produced a destabilizing effect on income through variations in 
the price and in the volume exported to the same destination. 
Consequently, going beyond the market profitability, it is 
necessary to evaluate the cost and viability of these methods as means 
of reducing instability, so as.to determine subsequently, on the basis 
of this information, the desirable degree of diversification. The 
market profitability of those products whose prices show the greatest 
instability should be corrected in the extent to which they have not. 
been internalized by businessmen who themselves diversify their 
operation categories, increasing their effective protection so as to 
reflect in this manner the social profitability. Thus, selection of 
the blend of exported products can be compared conceptually to the 
search for the best possible type of investment portfolio, taking into 
account both the profitability and the risk of exportable goods. 
Generally speaking, the most suitable category of exports for this • 
analysis in this case are those which show the relatively most stable 
markets. In a first approximation, these can be identified as being 
different from coffee. It may be noted, however, that it is likely 
that any diversification in the external trade of a country whose 
principal exports have a price showing a high degree of variation will 
/tend to 
tend to reduce the instability of the export price index, since the 
fluctuations of the new products placed on the world market will not 
be identical with each other or with those affecting the main exports. 
The diversification of markets will also help to reduce 
instability in the export sector. The political fragmentation of the 
world into sovereign States which reserve for themselves, within 
quite wide margins, the right to intervene in the control of their 
foreign trade means that international markets - which are nothing but 
the domestic markets of other countries - suffer from imperfect or 
uncertain accessibility. Inasmuch as some of the reasons for the 
adoption of protectionist measures in a particular country are 
independent of those adopted in another country, the diversification 
of markets will reduce the risk faced by the export sector as a whole 
and will give rise to an external economy which may not be completely 
internalized by the export enterprises (thus requiring the corrective 
action of the State). The degree and security of access to 
international markets therefore constitutes a key factor in the 
selection of the export promotion.mechanisms to be used and the type 
of external markets towards which the efforts to sell national 
products are to be directed. 
Moreover, increasing exports of coffee may, for Colombia, 
represent the "cheapest" way of generating new; external resources. 
However if the country (or a group of exporting countries which 
co-ordinate their politics in that respect), have some degree of 
monopoly power in the international market, the maximization of the 
benefits which can be obtained for the country through the trade of 
this product may call for the restriction of supply with the object 
of securing an improvement in the terms of trade. Similarly, in a 
dynamic context, the idea of "impoverishment through growth" indicates 
that in some cases the fact of making new investments in a product 
for which there is an inelastic external demand may, as a result of 
the intensity, of the negative impact it has on the terms of trade, 
lead to a lower level of wellbeing than that initially enjoyed. Since 
/the preceding 
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the preceding argument points to the inadvisability of concentrating 
investment resources solely on the "major" export branch, it is also 
an argument in favour of the diversification of exports. 
The category of exports which should be promoted in keeping with 
this last argument is that of products whose prices, for the country 
concerned or for a group of countries acting in co-ordination, are not 
affected by the amounts they export; it is the "minor" exports of a 
country which may encounter prices which are not affected by the level 
of sales. These minor exports may include industrial products, and 
also products of agricultural or mining origin, always provided that 
they do not constitute a high proportion of the international 
transactions of the respective product, 
(c) Increased contribution by the industrial sector 
The progress which has been made in the industrialization process, 
and also the recognition of the increasing importance of economies of 
scale, give rise to the need to seek broader markets, that is to say to 
export manufactures, in order to carry forward the development of the 
industrial sector. 
Various economic arguments can be adduced to justify the 
promotion of particular industrial and agro-industrial activities 
insofar as certain desirable characteristics of the production processes 
(such as, for example, the creation of technologies which can 
subsequently be disseminated and the absorption of urban unemployment) 
are present to a greater degree in these activities than in other 
sectors of the economy. These characteristics often constitute 
"external" features which are not fully reflected by the system of 
retail prices. This leads to .the need to correct the signals of the 
market in order to eliminate these distortions. 
Furthermore, the recent history of the economic development of 
Colombia would seem to indicate that the public authorities tend to 
favour a higher level of industrial production than is warranted by 
the indications of the market. It is possible that in many .cases this 
is not a non-economic preference but an intuitive awareness that 
/greater industrialization 
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greater industrialization can contribute in various ways to more; 
intensive economic development. It is difficult to distinguish between 
the two aspects, but there is no doubt that the more objectively the 
contribution of the sector is viewed, the more efficient the policy 
directed towards its development can be. 
Accepting, for the purpose of the analysis, that this extra-
economic preference for industrialization does exist, exports can make 
this choice less costly. Because of the substantial economies of scale 
involved in many industrial processes, development oriented towards 
the production of manufactures for external markets, both in the region 
and in third countries, will have a lower cost than industrial-
development of a substitutive nature oriented exclusively towards 
satisfying domestic demand. 
Furthermore, in certain periods there has been a serious neglect 
of the installed capacity in the industrial sector, partly as a result 
of the smallness of the domestic market and of a set of distortions 
which hinder the full utilization of the installed capacity. If it is 
attempted to increase the utilization of idle capacity solely by the 
method of expanding domestic demand, two major limitations are 
encountered. On the one hand, it causes an increase in the demand 
for imports which can only be satisfied if policies are adopted at the 
same time to divert domestic expenditure from other imports towards 
the purchase of national substitutes, and if greater exports are 
secured, some based on a greater use of the existing installed 
capacity, which would increase the foreign exchange income. Furthermore 
the size of the idle capacity is very heterogeneous according to 
sector; in the face of the difficulties of adjusting the structure of 
demand to that of installed capacity with precision, exports 
facilitate the distribution of the production of the surplus sectors 
and thus diminish the imbalances between supply and demand. It is 
thus possible to structure a strategy for the development of 
industrial exports which would use the excess installed capacity as 
one of its primary pivots. 
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Export of semi-manufactures and manufactures are the relevant 
category for analysis in this case» Exports of agriculture and mining 
origin, which although they may be minor or non-traditional exports 
are not characterized by high levels of under-utilization of the 
installed capacity, are thus excluded. It should be noted once again 
that the frontiers between sectors tend to be vague. The development 
of agro-industry or of the processing of mineral resources will 
generate domestic demand for the basic products; this will not occur, 
however, if the mechanisms of promotion encourage industrial production 
based mainly on imported components. The industrialization strategy 
therefore needs to be developed in accordance with the stage reached 
by the national economy, the imbalances which afflict it and the supply 
of resources available to it. 
In this section we will group the policies for the development 
of minor exports into three categories according to the global 
purposes which are pursued. They are termed here as policies of 
"compensation-equalization", "negotiation" and "over-compensation" 
or incentive policies. The first seek to compensate for the 
discrimination against the minor exports of the developing countries 
and a,s they merely aim to treat these exports in such a way as to put 
them on a level with the other sectors of the economy, they are termed 
policies of "compensation-equalization". The policies of negotiation, 
for their part, operate on the conditions of access to the domestic 
markets of other countries, which are variables which the country 
cannot directly manipulate in a unilateral manner in accordance with 
its own objectives, but which can be a subject of negotiation between 
States. Lastly, the policies of over-compensation aim to establish 
preferential treatment for minor exports by giving them more favourable 
treatment than that granted to the other sectors of the economy. 
For the efficient allocation of the scant resources which a 
country possesses, policies are required which lead to a situation 
where the social cost, in real resources, of generating foreign 
currency through exports can be made equal to that of releasing 
foreign exchange through import substitution«," This formula allows of 
various interpretations, however, with-varying implications for the 
formulation of the corresponding economic policies» The interpretations 
can be classified in three groups» One of these, the simplest, 
maintains that the optimum results are attained with free trade which 
involves an overall rate of exchange, (including taxes and subsidies, 
if any), which is similar for each export and import» A second approach 
takes into consideration the instability of the international markets, 
particularly of traditional exports» A third interpretation, which 
forms part of the theory of development, attempts to make allowance 
for the various imbalances which characterize the developing- economies 
in the formulation of policies of substitution and promotion» The 
three approaches are considered below» 
For various reasons, the Latin American countries have followed 
a policy of import substitution at the national level which has 
provided the activities involved in the process with high effective 
protection. The range of policies adopted to control foreign trade 
created a discrimination against exports as the protection referred to 
lessened the demand for imports and thus made possible the maintenance 
of a rate of exchange lower than that which would have prevailed if no 
such policy had been implemented, which has in fact discriminated 
against exportable goods, particularly minor exports, and against 
import substitutes which receive low tax protection. Consequently, 
when formulating foreign trade policies, the interaction between the 
two sectors cannot be ignored; protection of the import substitution 
sector means some degree of discrimination against the exporting 
sector. Furthermore, the tariffs levied on the inputs which are used 
by the exporting activities and the higher price of the national 
inputs which are protected by high tariffs affect the costs of 
/production and 
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production and create negative effective protection for these activities. 
Consequently, the exchange and tax policies have discriminated against 
exportable goods, with the result that the resources which have entered 
this sector have been of a sub-optimum level. 
The subject of transport is a further element of the analysis 
which is of great importance for the developing countries® trade. The 
transport routes and tariff systems are conditioned by the traditional 
patterns of trade, and this represents an artificial obstacle to the 
development of new lines of exports, particularly towards other 
developing countries, which the export policy must aim to remove. The 
inadequacy of transport services is very marked not only between 
countries in distant continents but also between countries of a same 
region, as is shown by the difficulties of transport between Colombia 
and the countries of the Caribbean area. 
The preceding argument should be broadened to take into account 
the fact that in the real world there are other sources of discrimination 
originating both in the instability of the international markets and 
in the imbalances and distortions of the developing economies. 
Consequently, a broad concept of compensation-equalization would require 
the establishment of mechanisms to neutralize these distortions, when 
they cannot eliminate them at the source. This is because some 
distortions (such as'those associated with external economies or 
dynamic external factors) disappear only with development; others are 
linked with the conduct of foreign countries or decision-making units 
(as in the case of oligopolistic or unstable foreign markets) while 
others can only be partially removed (such as unemployment in some 1 
economies). 
In;the case of unstable external markets, an adequate.set of 
policies should include, in addition to an exchange policy guided by 
the medium-tferm trends rather than the short-term balance-of-payments 
situation, measures aimed at favouring those products which, because 
of their lesser degree of instability, do not provoke adverse external 
factors for the rest of the economy; such measures would thus lead to 
a greater diversification of exports. 
, /With regard 
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With regard to domestic d isequi l ibr ia , the pol icy of compensation-
equalization requires the use of incentives linked to the nature of the 
production processes, regardless of whether these are aimed at the 
domestic or the external market. In this case, the compensation must 
be linked with factors such as labour absorption and the generation of 
external savings» Thus compensation should vary in accordance with the 
characterist ics of the corresponding production processes, except where 
i t i s feas ib le to provide direct subsidies to these aspects. The 
d i f f i c u l t y of obtaining f i s ca l resources in some developing countries 
makes this course of action more d i f f i c u l t . 
There i s therefore no need for a categorical choice between 
exports and the substitution of imports; instead e f f o r t s should be 
made to attain the optimum l e ve l and composition of the resources, 
which should flow towards production destined for each of the markets. 
The argument of the analysis points to the need to discriminate between 
d i f f e rent categories on the basis of the d i f ferences between the 
private and social prices of the component parts of their production 
processes. The general recommendation deriving from the analysis i s 
that the system of t a r i f f protection should be similar to that of 
incentives to exports. However, because of the f i s c a l res t r ic t ions 
which a f f e c t the governments of the developing countries, i t would 
seem advisable that the second system should have a somewhat lower 
average l e v e l . Furthermore, the heterogeneity. of the imperfections of 
the external markets should influence the pattern of incentives. 
In sum, the policy of compensation-equalization i s based on a 
neutral approach according to which minor exports should receive 
pre ferent ia l treatment under some po l i c i es , because otherwise.the 
discrimination a f f ec t ing them would pers is t . The pre ferent ia l 
treatment could consist, where i t i s both v iable and e f f i c i e n t , in the 
direct elimination of the elements which generated this adverse 
discrimination; otherwise, compensation could be made through some of 
the instruments of the export po l icy . The export "subsidies" required 
on the basis of this argument are absolutely leg i t imate and should not 
be considered as an example of unfair competition in international trade. 
/ (b ) Po l i c i es 
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(b ) Po l i c i es of negotiation 
The framework within which the local enterprises carry out their 
exporting a c t i v i t i e s i s determined by the economic'policies of the 
importing countries and behaviour of the economic agents which play a 
part in international trade, particularly the transnational enterprises. 
This external framework has some characterist ics which can 
adversely a f f e c t the minor exports of the developing countries. The 
industrial ized nations maintain t a r i f f and non-tar i f f res t r i c t ions 
which cause d i f f i c u l t i e s of access for the exports of manufactures 
from the res t .o f the world, and the device of graduated t a r i f f s , with 
nominal rates which r i se in l ine with the degree of processing, provide 
considerable e f f e c t i v e protection to the domestic producers which 
operate in sectors which compete with the exports of the developing 
countries. Moreover, the non-discriminatory t a r i f f reductions have 
favoured these goods which are mostly traded among the same developed 
J 
countries. Furthermore, when sensit ive sectors of the economies of 
these countries see their interests a f fected, they press for the rules 
against export subsidies to be applied and, a l leg ing the existence of 
such subsidies or of dumping, try to have compensatory t a r i f f s imposed 
on imports from the developing countries. F inal ly , in situations of 
balance-of-payments cr ises, the industrial ized countries have resorted 
to protect ionist measures which, although concentrated on certain 
products, generate uncertainty and increase the r isks run by the 
exporters in the developing countries. 
Furthermore, some international markets are dominated by a few 
trasnational enterprises which co l lec t quasi-income in the process of 
distr ibution and.marketing and exercise their o l i gopo l i s t i c power to 
the detriment of the exporters of the developing countries. Although 
i t i s probable that the lessening of obstacles of governmental or ig in 
to import leads to greater international special izat ion and increases 
trade f lows, the measure can prove unfavourable for the developing , 
nations i f the increased trade mainly takes place between branches 
of the same corporation or group, without adequate regulation on the 
part of the host governments. 
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Broadly speaking, i t could be said that there are two forces in 
the international market which have tended to act in favour of their 
improvement - namely, the reduction of t a r i f f res t r i c t ions in the 
developed countries and the emergence of new transnational corporations 
which compete with those already in existence - and two forces which 
increase their segmentation, namely the increasing importance of trade 
between branches of transnational enterprises and the persistence of 
non-tar i f f res t r i c t ions in the developed countries. 
Although i t i s d i f f i c u l t for individual exporters to change these 
situations, States are in a position to negotiate more l i be ra l 
conditions of access; to advocate systems of t a r i f f preferences; to 
establish marketing enterprises jo in t ly with other countries; to 
negotiate entry into certain markets by assuring the supply of scarce 
raw materials in return, or, l a s t l y , to reach agreements providing fo r 
negotiating access. 
In a world where power po l i t i c s are also important in economic 
transactions, po l i c i es need to make use of a l l the negotiating capacity 
of the country in order to create the most favourable external framework 
for i t s exports. S t r i c t l y speaking, the measures included in th is 
category of po l i c i es also tend towards compensation-equalization. 
However they do not a f f e c t the conditions and costs of production or 
the income earned per dol lar of exports: instead they influence the 
volume and conditions of sales abroad. 
( c ) Po l i c i es of over-compensation ( incentive po l i c i es ) . 
The arguments in favour of providing incentives for non-
tradit ional exports in amounts which go beyond compensation-equalization 
and do not constitute a use of the national negotiating power in order 
to improve the external framework are either based on non-economic 
considerations or constitute erroneous arguments; a third group form, 
part of the strategies aimed at achieving economic development through 
the creation of certain imbalances. 
As regards the f i r s t argument, i t i s frequently maintained that 
the authorit ies have a "preference" for á greater degree of 
industr ia l izat ion, disregarding the economic considerations .already 
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set for th . Recently, within this l ine of thinking, export promotion 
as such has required a status analogous to the indiscriminate 
substitution of imports» The equivalent of the absolute protection 
provided through quantitative restr ic t ions or prohibit ive t a r i f f s on 
substitutable imports i s the pro l i f e ra t ion of exports incentives of a l l 
kinds. When this occurs, the danger arises that the lack of s e l e c t i v i t y 
and moderation of a pol icy of this nature may lead to an ine f f i c i en t 
diversion of resources towards exports, through their over-promotion, 
and may often result in high f i s ca l costs, as well as regressive 
redistr ibution, a meagre contribution to employment, and an impl ic i t 
subsidy to the foreign consumer» 
Another l ine of argument in favour of the over-compensation of 
exports aims at bringing about an a r t i f i c i a l increase in the 
competit ivity of national production by subsidizing the actual costs 
which the country incurs. Three examples of this are the proposing of 
subsidies for national exports because: (a ) transport costs to the place 
of destination are high because of the distance between markets 
(b) other countries subsidize their exports of the same products, and 
( c ) the importing countries apply t a r i f f res t r ic t ions which reduce the 
poss ib i l i t y of competing within these markets. The nature of each of 
these three cases needs to be careful ly considered. In the f i r s t 
example, a dist inct ion must.be drawn between a r t i f i c i a l l y high costs 
which the country can reduce through an act ive transport pol icy and 
the.argument of " incipient transport and marketing channels" which f a l l s 
within the category of compensation po l i c i es , as was explained in the 
relevant section, whereas the high costs caused by the d i f f i c u l t y of 
reaching the markets of destination rea l ly do constitute a genuine 
outlay of currency which reduces the FOB income. 
A similar analysis can be made of the arguments re lat ing to the 
export subsidies and import taxes applied by other countries. The 
essential point i s whether, these can be removed through some type of 
negotiation (b i l a t e ra l or international ) or whether they rea l l y are 
permanent. I f they are l i k e l y to persist f o r a prolonged period, 
regardless of the po l i c i es of negotiation.which the country attempts, 
the granting of subsidies to national exporters to o f f s e t the e f f e c t s 
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of the po l i c i es of other countries w i l l improve their competitive 
posit ion at the expensé of the f i s ca l budget and at some cost to 
the country.. Thus, except in situations which are c lear ly transitory 
or in the case of production processes or goods which have some posi t ive 
characterist ic which is not re f l ec ted by the market prices (the case 
o f compensation-equalization), there is no jus t i f i ca t i on , from the 
point of view Of contributing to national development, for granting 
subsidies aimed at re l i ev ing the exporter of costs which in fact 
constitúte an e f f e c t i v e burden for the économy of the country. 
The third group of arguments are more d i f f i c u l t to c l ass i f y « 
They are based on the theories of "unbalanced development", which 
emphasize the inert ia of the system, and their proponents recommend 
that f inancia l over-compensations should be granted.in order to attract 
resources towards the exporting sector more rapidly and intensively. 
This can indeed make possible a.greater dynamism.of exports, but at 
the cóst of creating quasi-income or capital gains fo r the exporters. 
The a l ternat ive to this option is to spend these resources;on the 
promotion of exports through*direct measures such as investment in 
marketing enterprises and in those, producing exportable goods. 
(d ) The importance of distinguishing between compensation 
and over-cOmpensation 
Various export pol icy instruments can be used to compensate and 
to over-compensate. In this respect, there are no spec i f i c instruments 
of either category, since these categories are not ident i f i ed by the 
mechanisms which are used in each casé but by the degree to which they 
are used compared with the i n i t i a l cii ¿'crimination exist ing against 
minor exports. 
The dist inct ion we are making i s relevant in terms of the 
p o l i t i c a l economics of the process of export' promotion in making these 
po l i c i es more acceptable in both the national and the international 
spheres. In the f i r s t of these spheres, the rea l i zat ion that ¿ rea l 
devaluation of the rate of exchange and the use o f ' o ther instruments 
to encourage exports do not constitute an unjust i f ied subsidy within 
certain l im i t s , but merely the elimination of negative discrimination, 
w i l l reduce the degree of resistance to these po l i c i es . 
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At the international l e v e l , the acceptance of the concept of 
compensation-equalization po l i c i es would weaken the argument of some 
industr ial ized countries that since the developing countries grant 
subsidies to their exports this makes them l i ab l e to the application 
of compensatory t a r i f f s on these products. Thus the concept of 
dumping should be reconsidered, taking into account the discrimination 
which exists against non-minor exports, so that po l i c i es entai l ing 
compensatory subsidies do not constitute "unfair competition"* but 
merely represent the neutralization of the repercussions of other 
economic po l i c i es and of the distort ions in the markets of the 
developing countries on their exports. The GATT rules and the new 
United States Trade Act contains clauses which provide f o r the 
imposition of compensatory duties on subsidized exports of the 
developing countries. I t should be stressed that in these countries 
there i s a much greater i n i t i a l bias against exports than in the 
developed nations, so that a certain leve l of subsidy is j u s t i f i e d 
i f i t i s not possible to eliminate the sources of discrimination. 
One of the aims of the policy of negotiation is thus to secure the 
acceptance at the international l e ve l of the dist inct ion between 
j u s t i f i e d and unjust i f ied subsidies, in this case in the appropriate 
world forum. 
Conclusion 
When designing a promotion pol icy , i t i s necessary to be 
se lect ive in defining the category of exports to be encouraged, in the 
l i g h t of the object ives pursued with the export pol icy. I f the 
object ive i s to generate foreign exchange income at the lowest cost 
in domestic resources, then exports with greatest social p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
are of greatest interest . I f the object ive is to reduce the ins tab i l i t y 
arising in the exporting sector, exports of products which provide 
income that varies only l i t t l e and are destined to markets where there 
is stable access are of greatest interest . I f the aim pursued is to 
t r y to avoid a deterioration in the terms of trade, exports for which 
there i s demand of high price and income e l as t i c i t y are of most interest . 
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Final ly i f what is sought i s to increase the contribution made by the 
industr ia l sector to the economy, exports of semi-manufactures and 
manufactures are of greatest interest . As a semantic s impl i f i cat ion 
we w i l l use the term "minor" to ident i f y the category of exports 
which are to be promoted. 
An integrated view of social p r o f i t a b i l i t y or of the 
contribution made to national development must include a l l the 
examples set forth iii the preceding paragraph. Since, each object ive 
is not being pursued alone, but in the l i gh t of i t s contribution to 
development, the intensity with which each is pursued must be: 
determined by the p r i o r i t i e s of the other goals. Consideration of 
the influences which each exerts on the other i s one of the aspects 
that must play a decisive ro le in the design of the po l i c i es to be 
applied. 
I t i s perhaps necessary to close this chapter with a warning. 
In the past there may have been a clear trend in favour of import 
substitution which, owing to the fa i lure to consider the costs of the 
process, culimnated in over-substitution, with excessive protection 
for some products at the expense of others, and in the i n e f f i c i en t , 
use of foreign trade instruments and mechanisms. What must be 
pointed out now are the dangers of over promotion of minor exports. 
I t i s not enough to af f irm simply that exports must be promoted; i t 
i s necessary also to define the object ives sought and to discuss 
the structure, frequency, duration and l e v e l of the indirect incentives 
and direct mechanisms that w i l l be used. This involves an attempt 
to evaluate, quantitatively or qua l i ta t i ve ly , the costs and benef i ts 
of each policy option in terms o f national development and an attempt 
to design a pol icy of promotion to exports as an integral part of the 
development strategy. 
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Chapter I I 
EXPORT TRENDS 
This chapter contains a description and analysis pf the 
performance of Colombian exports in the period 1952-1975» The 
information to 1973 iB complete, broken down and de f i n i t i v e , but 
only incomplete f igures are avai lable for 1974 and 1975« The rea l 
substance of the chapter l i e s in the 12 tables and 3 f igures. The 
text i t s e l f i s del iberate ly short, and singles out the most striking 
features of the tables and f igures to be found at the end of the 
chapter. Section one deals with the general trend of the l eve l of 
the major and minor exports, while the other two sections concentrate 
on the d i ve rs i f i ca t i on of exports both by product and by market of 
destination, • 
1. Overall trend 
Table 1 sets forth the basic information on Colombian exports. 
Two fundamental categories, major and minor exports, are distinguished, 
within which the more important subgroups are indicated® In order to 
be able to draw conclusions which are not distorted by changes in the 
price l eve l s of the d i f f e r en t goods, and thus r e f l e c t the real var iat ions 
in the value of exports, a special e f f o r t has been madé to def late the 
series in current values by the appropriate price indicés so as to 
obtain re l iab le series of exports at constant prices. Due to the ' 
method of de f lat ion used, the real values obtained tend to measure 
the quantum of exports; i , e , , rather than the purchasing power of the 
export earnings, the overal l trend of the real resources used by the 
countries in generating exports» In simple terms, these two approaches 
coincide only when the terms of trade remain constant. 
The major exports are broken down into co f f e e , crude petroleum 
and fue l o i l ; the minor exports into manufactures (including semi-
manufactures), the BAAT group of bananas, sugar, cotton and tobacco, 
and other minor exports (other primary products from mining, agricultural 
or f i she r i e s ) . Table 1 shows the exports at current values of each 
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year and at 1970 prices. I t also includes the part ia l price indexes 
used to de f la te each of the components mentioned. The to ta l exports 
index represents the unit price iridex of exports, estimated on the 
basis of each of the part ia l indexes, weighted by their r e la t i ve 
importance in each year. 
Table 2 and f igure 1 summarize the trend of the value of exports 
at constant prices in a number of important biennia, in order to 
provide a clearer picture of the real performance of major and minor 
exports. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn about the performance of 
major exports: 
( i ) They are characterized by a lack of dynamism. Between 
1952-1953 and 1973 they only rose from US'® *f90 mil l ion to US®"530 mil l ion 
( in 1970 do l l a rs ) , an average annual growth rate ! of only 0.5 per cent. 
At the period of peak growth, 1960-1961 to 1969-1970, they reached an 
annual average rate of only 1.5 per cent. Petroleum exports, with a 
share of 15 pe? cent on average between 1952 and 1967, dropped 
drast ica l ly to 2 per cent in 1973 and disappeared altogether in 1975« 
, ( i i ) The frequent, severe f luctuations in the value of the major 
exports i s immediately apparent from the f igures in current values and 
the corresponding price index, basical ly due to the ins tab i l i t y of the 
income derived from co f f ee exports. In 1952-1953 these represented 
82 per cent of the value of exports, whose value they dominated in 
the period under consideration; but they declined in importance, unt i l 
in 1973 they represented only 50 per cent of t o ta l Colombian sales 
abroad. The co f f ee price index (1970 = 100) h i ts a peak of 130 in 
1974, and a trough of 67^in 1963. I t i s interest ing to note that 
changes in the Colombian supply of co f f ee have not been a determining 
factor in the f luctuations, which would have had a s tab i l i z ing e f f e c t 
on co f fee export earnings, but rather changes in the supply and demand 
of other countries which have led to transfers of the demand (excess 
demand) for Colombian co f f e e ; this has a destabi l iz ing e f f e c t on incomes, 
since price and quantity vary in the same d irect ion. 
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Thé value of the minor exports in constant 1970 prices, on the 
other hand, increased from USft 27 mil l ion in 1952-1953 to US$ 50 mil l ion 
in I96O-I96I, an average annual growth rate of 9»4 per cent» The 1960s 
witnessed the Colombian export boom, when minor exports grew at an 
average annual rate of 18 per cent to reach US$ 190 mil l ion in 
1969-1970o From then unt i l 1973 they grew at 15 per cent annually, 
amounting to US$ 290 mil l ion in 1973» I t should be pointed out that 
during this period there was a substantial r ise in the prices of the 
minor exports (almost 50 per cent in three years) , with a consequent 
e f f e c t on their value at current prices; however, in f l a t i on in the 
world markets rose steeply during that period, which" explains the 
\ sharp growth of exports at yearly prices at the sâme time as a 
slackening of their real growth at constant prices. 
The enormous di f ference in the growth rates of the' major and 
minor exports obviously led to a s igni f icant changé in the share of 
each sub-group in totk l 'Colombian exports. Minor exports, which 
represented only 5 per cent of to ta l Colombian exports, came to 
represent 50 per cent in';1975. Coffee exports, which in 1952-1953 
made Colombia v i r tua l l y a single-export country (82 per cent of the 
t o t a l ) , generated less than half i t s export earnings in 1975° There 
can be no doubt, then, that the main object ive of Colombian export 
pol icy - to reduce s ign i f i cant ly Colombia's dependence on co f f ee by 
increasing minor exports - has been sa t i s fac to r i l y achieved. 
2. Divers i f i cat ion by product 
There have been substantial changes in the composition of minor 
exports during the period under,consideration. To f a c i l i t a t e the 
study of the nature of these developments, the data have been grouped 
1 
according to a number of d i f f e rent c r i t e r i a in tables 3 to 7» 
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The information r e f l e c t ing the sectoral or ig in of the new 
exports i s shown in table 3, grouped in seven categories; three of 
agr icultural o r i g in , other primary products, semi-manufactures, 
manufactures and other.1/ Figure 2 helps to give a picture of the ir 
trends. 
Four products of agricultural or ig in accounted f o r wel l over 
50 per cent of the t o ta l during the f i r s t hal f of the period. These 
products were the so-cal led .BAAT group of bananas, sugar, cotton and 
tobacco. Over the last ten years, despite the fact that the value 
and volume of BAAT exports continued to grow, the ir share steadi ly 
dropped to about one-third of t o ta l minor exports in the f i n a l years 
of the period under consideration. 
The other important development concerns semi-manufactures, 
whose share grew steadi ly unt i l in 1973 they accounted for one-third 
of minor exports, and together with manufactures, over one-half of 
them. In 1973 they represented one - f i f th of Colombia's to ta l exports« 
In the fo l lowing two years, however, there was a sharp drop in their 
sales, part icular ly in the case of cotton fabr i c , clothing and 
footwear. 
The three-d ig i t SITC was used as the basis for the disaggregation« 
Bovine cat t l e f o r consumption (SITC 001 minus "other animals") ; 
BAAT - bananas (SITC 051 minus "other fresh f r u i t s and nuts" ) , 
sugar, cotton and tobacco; other agr icul tural products: SITC 051 
minus bananas, fresh f lowers and buds and other similar products; 
excluding wood in the rough; other primary products: wood in the 
rough, "other animals", waste scraps, undressed hides and skins, 
crude minerals and ore; semi-manufactures and manufactures: 
broken down according to the c l ass i f i ca t i on adopted by UNCTAD 
(TD/B/C»2/3), 1965, "Measures related to the report of the 
special commission on preferences. Def in i t ion of commodities, 
semi-manufactures and manufactures"; other exports; those 
not c l ass i f i ed in the above groups or sub-groups. 
/Exports of 
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Exports of bovine cat t l e have been c lass i f i ed separately because 
of their errat ic performance„1/ This i r regular i ty i s partly due to 
a s t a t i s t i ca l problem, and r e f l e c t s changes between the Volumes recorded 
and those exported fraudulently« 
Table k shows the annual f luctuations in the prices of the main 
groups of Colombian exports. Besides the fact -that price f luctuations 
may s tab i l i ze income, when they are due to variat ions in the Colombian 
supply f o r exports, the overal l picture of f luctuations should be 
examined since there may be inverse correlations among the prices of the 
export products, so that the overal l price picture may be more stable 
than that of the individual products. 
The f luctuations in the country's export earnings have been . 
lessened by d i ve rs i f i ca t i on . The average annual variat ion of . the unit 
value of minor exports in the period 1953-1973 i s less than that of 
c o f f e e . To appreciate the ro le played by d i ve rs i f i ca t i on , i t i s 
interesting to look in de ta i l at what occurred in the BAAT group. 
The four products comprising i t are characterized by price ins tab i l i t y . 
Thus, for example, the pricè of sugar may f luctuate by as much as 
kb per cent per year. Hotoever, although a l l the components of the 
BAAT group have a common economic or ig in, their price variations are 
not c losely correlated and even show an inverse correlat ion in some 
years. I t i s frequently the case that in a single year the price of 
sugar may drop sharply, that of cotton r ise steeply and thè price of 
bananas remain stable, as happened in I960. Due to the di f ferences 
in the performance of each of i t s components, thè BAÀT price index 
i s s ign i f i cant ly more stable than that of each of them. 
Table 5 shows the composition of BAAT exports and the ir t o ta l 
value, so that i t i s possible to note the varying importance of each 
product within the to ta l and the substantial share of the minor 
exports they represent. 
1/ Another item itfhich behaves in a similar manner i s precious 
~~ stones (especia l ly emeralds). They have been included here 
among major exports. 
/Table 6 
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Table 6 gives the main Colombian export products in 197^ and 
1975» while table 7 contains the complete breakdown of Colombian 
exports from 1970 to 1973« The l eve l of d i ve rs i f i ca t i on i s once 
again str ik ing, with the inclusion of groups fr.om very d i f f e rent 
sectoral or ig in . In the last three years, between 20 and 30 products 
are in the exclusive category of products with sales abroad of over 
one mil l ion do l lars . 
In order to provide a more exact view of the d i ve rs i f i ca t i on 
achieved by Colombian exports during the period under study, table 8 
provides data broken down by group of products.1/ Here i t may be seen 
that whereas one product accounted fo r more than 80 per cent of to ta l 
exports in 1952, this had risen to twelve groups of products in 1973» 
Similarly, between 1952 and 1973, the number of SITC groups which 
showed some movement had doubled. . The a c t i v i t y gained greater 
dynamism with the reforms carried out in the export promotion regime 
in 1957. Figure 3 Uses a well-known indicator of d i ve rs i f i ca t i on (or 
inequal i ty ) , the Lorenz curve, to give a better picture of the stages 
of d i ve rs i f i ca t i on which, as may be seen, correspond very c losely to 
the phases of Colombian export promotion po l i cy . 
3» Divers i f i cat ion by market 
The marked d i ve rs i f i ca t i on of Colombian exports in terms of 
products also occurred with regard to the markets of destination, as 
i s shown by tables 9 to 11. The overal l trend in geographical 
distr ibution d i f f e r ed sharply between the f i r s t and second halves of 
the period. Furthermore, there was a s igni f icant d i f ference in the 
performance of the major and minor exports in respect of destination, 
which may be seen by comparing tables 10 and 11. 
With regard to t o ta l exports, an overwhelming proportion of sales 
in 1952 was made to the United States, but this percentage dropped 
steadi ly throughout the period. Until halfway through the nineteen-
s ix t i es this.trend i s very pronounced. Even when other markets begin 
1/ Defined at the three d i g i t l eve l of the SITC c l ass i f i ca t i on . 
/to displace 
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to displace the United States, however, the European Economic Community 
takes the largest share, growing from 10 per cent in 1952-1955 to a 
l i t t l e over one-quarter in 1964-1967« At this point the United States 
market was already absorbing less than half of Colombian exports. 
The share of the countries which came to form the Latin American 
Free Trade Association (LAFTA). remained at about 1 per cent during the 
f i r s t decade. In the nineteen-sixt ies, with the signing of the 
Montevideo Treaty, this increased to some extent-: the share of the 
LAFTA group markets grew to four per cent. 
Along similar l ines to the d ivers i f i ca t ion of products, there was 
a marked change in the geographic distribution of exports from the end 
of the nineteen-sixt ies. As a result , by 1975 three areas had acquired 
similar importance - the EEC, the United States and Latin America - and 
between them shared 80 per cent of the export trade. Thus the United 
States' share f e l l by two-thirds, to the advantage f i r s t of the EEC 
and then of the Latin American countries, especial ly during the last 
f i v e years. In the nineteen-seventies most of th is trade was concentrated 
in the Andean Pact countries. 
The importance of the geographic d i ve rs i f i ca t i on i s somewhat 
blurred by the presence of the major exports, which have mainly been 
concentrated in the developed countries. Table 11 therefore presents, 
information about the markets of destination of the.minor exports. 
I t i s interesting to note that the market d i ve rs i f i ca t i on of minor 
exports i s far greater than that of to ta l exports. The overal l picture 
of changes throughout the period i s similar to that of the changes, in 
to ta l sales. However, the re la t i ve share of each geographic area 
remains d i f f e rent for the major and minor exports, with a r is ing share 
for the Latin American markets. Towards the end of the period the 
l a t t e r accounted for about one-third of the minor exports. 
The ro le of the integration processes, as wel l as geographical 
locat ion, may be observed more precisely, in the placing of minor exports. 
Once again, i t i s the sales to the Andean countries which unmistakably 
show more rapid growth, more so in respect of the minor exports than of 
the t o t a l . 
/ I t should 
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I t should be pointed out that the r e l a t i v e shares do not alone give 
an exact view of the behaviour of the market, since the value of the 
minor exports has not grown regularly, primarily due to the ups and 
downs of the markets of the developed countries. This i s part icularly 
clear in the most recent years. Sales to the Andean countries, on the 
other hand, have grown steadi ly , part icularly in 197^ and 1975° 
At the end of the period under study, a s igni f icant market 
d i ve rs i f i ca t i on had been achieved, covering a large number of countries. 
The key-note of this phenomenon has been the opening up of new markets, 
above a l l the regional markets, and especial ly those linked to Colombia 
by formal integration processes. These markets are of special 
importance for minor exports. Thus the two types of export 
d i ve rs i f i ca t i on of product and of market, coincide. 
F inal ly , i t i s interest ing to note in table 12 the l eve l of 
concentration in co f f ee exports by exporting companies. I t i s 
interest ing to note here that there are almost 900 Colombian export 
companies. Only Ik of these have sales abroad of over 10 mil l ion 
dol lars ; they account for one-third of t o ta l exports. About 150 
companies export for values of between one and 10 mil l ion do l lars , 
and account for a l i t t l e undei- half of the exports» These f igures 
suggest that there i s not an undue concentration in the export sector; • 
while the exportable l ines in the industrial sector show substantial 
economies of scale, which tends to lead to a concentration of plants 
and companies, the importance of exports of agr icultural or ig in may 




COLOMBIA« MAJOR AND MINOR EXPORTS, AT CURRENT AND CONSTANT PRICES, 1952-1975* 
(Millions of dollars» fob» In prices of eaah year and 1970 prloea) 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 19-5 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Total exports 
At current prices 
At constant prioes 
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Table 1 {tonal uded) 
1952 1953 1954- ^55 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
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At current prices 
At constant prices 
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33.8 4o«8 47.0 45,3 64.5 75.0 75.1 97.7 11*3,7 243.4 3 2 1 . 3 
39.3 4 6 . 3 52.2 49.8 7 0 . 9 79*8 75«l 93.0 127»2 183,0 200,8 










15,5 15.3 26,8 34.9 311,9 32.0 2 8 , 5 4l»o 60,7 77,0 7%»6 ?4*6 60,8 7 6 , 3 56.7 
189.6 1 3 1 . 8 103.4 107.2 3 7 . 1 1 1 3 . 2 1 1 0 . 4 1 1 0 , 5 1 1 0 . 9 90,2 9 5 . 1 95.6 1 0 1 . 1 loo.cj 1 1 5 , 6 1 3 7 . 8 1 7 6 . 1 





5.8 5.3 ~ 1 6 . 3 13.8 9.5 16.5 31.9 42,5 50.6 7 6 , 1 88.6 1 3 2 . 3 
3.9 4.7 5.1 5.3 5.0 6,2 5.1 17.3 14.5 lo. l 17.7 33.6 4 2 . 5 47.7 6 3 . 4 53.9 48.5 
94.0 92.0 92.0 90.0 89.0 94.0 97.0 94.0 95.0 94.0 93*0 35,0 100.0 106.0 120.3 174,0 273.0 
expp 
Souroea; DANE (Foreign Trade Yearbooks): Export 
'manufactures and primary producta. 
e j The indices of 'Minor exports" and "T^tal 
t/ Major exports include coffee, petroleum, fuoi 
in the table; but they are inoluded in the to 
0/ Exports of manufactures were deflated by tha 
d/ The BAAT prioe index *as calculated using the 
total BAAT group of .the previous year, 
e/ "Other minor exports" ware deflated by "the Ui 
* As the DANE Yearbooks for 1974 and 1975 ara 
Üata at ourrent prioes; CEP AL, Statistical Divisions Prioe indioes of coffee, petroleum and füel oi l j Monthly Bulletin of Statistics! World price indices of 
ftf>" were obtained by adding the partial Indioes at oonstant prioes and using them to divide the same data at currant prices. 
i l , other petroleum by-produots and precious stones. Exports of preoious stones (inoluding emeralds) and other petroleum by-produots are not presented separately 
i&l of major exports. 
Xilueti liitions wrld prioe index of manufactures. 
current data of the Foreign Trade Yearbooks, weighting the annual variations in the prioes of eaoh of the products composing it by its percentage share in Uie 
nited Nati ons •world eottmodity prioe index. 
npt yet available, only a few figures were obtained for those years by means of dlreot consultation with DANE. 
Table 1 
COLOMBIA: SSE INDICATORS OP EXPORT TRENDS 




1952-1553 1960-1961 1969-1970 1971 1972 1973 Rate of growth (annual average) 
Per- 1960-61 1969-70 1973 1973 
aillions Millions Millions Millions Millions Millions 
per- Per- Per- Per- Per-
° f cartage , f c e n t a l J oentame _ centage „ ° f centage _ ° f centa3e 1952-53 196û-6l 1965-70 1952-53 dollars uollars dollars dollars dollars dollars 
513,0 100.0 336.6 100.0 73O.2 100.0 736.9 100.0 D3C.0 100.0 818.3 100.0 0.62 4.06 3.49 2.61 
W7.1 94.8 4C6.3 90.6 540.1 74.2 336.3 72.8 573.4 68.4 529.1 64.7 -0.02 1.50 - 1 . 1 6 0.46 
26.7 5.2 50.3 9.4 190.1 25.0 200.6 27.2 264.6 31.6 289.2 35.3 9.4 18.08 15.01 1 4 . 1 5 
Source! Table l i 
VjJ 1—' 
Table 1 





I96O-I963 I96H-I567 1963-1971 1972 1973 197W 1975a/ 
Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per- Per-
oentage centage centage oentage centage centage centage centage oentage oentage oentage oentage oentaga centage centage centage centage 
of of minor of of minor of of minor of of minor of of minor of of minor of of minor of of minor of cf minor 
total er.ports total exports total exports total exports total exports total exports total exports total exports total exports 
Coffee 
Petroleum and by 
products 
Precious stones 
Subtotal ma.jor ¡exports 
Bovine cattle fop 
consua./tlon j 
BAAT I 
0 tli er agricultural 
products 1 
Other primary products 






G2.5 76.6 70.5 66.0 60.1 49.7 50.8 
12.7 15.9 17.4 15.9 10,5 7.4 5.2 
* 0.6 5.3 7.4 
95.2 • Cl.? 2h¿ 62.4 63.4 46.0 49.7 
0.1 1 . 8 * * * 0.1 0.7 3.5 1.4 5.1 1 . 6 4.3 0.3 0.8 3.6 6.6b/ 3.8 7.6b/ 
2.7 56.2 4.9 63.8 7.7 62.6 C.X 44.1 11.5 4o.o 12,3 32.5 8 . 5 23.2 20 .2 37.4c/ 16.5 32.9c/ 
0.5 9.8 * 1 . 0 0.1 1 . 2 0.3 1.8 1.4 4.8 2.1 5.7 1 . 0 3.0 8.5 15.6 8.6 17.1 
0,6 13.7 0.8 10.3 0.9 7.8 1.1 6.3 2.5 8.5 5.0 13.4 6.1 16.8 3.2 6.0 3.3 6.5 
0.4 0.1 1 . 0 13.5 2.0 15.8 4.9 27.7 6 . 8 23.7 9.7 25.8 11.4 31.0 13.3 24.7 12.3 24.5 
0.4 C.4 0.4 5.0 0.8 6,8 2.9 15.8 4.8 1 6 . 4 6.6 17o 9.0 2 4.5 4.4 8.2 4.7 9.4 
0.1 2.0 0.4 6.4 0,6 5.7 0.1 0.8 0.4 1.5 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.0 2.0 
4.3 100.0 100 .0 1 2 . 1 100.0 lG.i 100.0 2S.8 loo.o HA 100.0 36.6 100.0 100.0 ¿M 100.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Soma; CEPAL, on 
a/ Provisional in 
b/ Agrégate figu? 
0/ Aggregate figuj: 
the basis of DAMS data (Foreign Trade Yearbooks). 
?or&a-fcion. Sample prepared by CEPAL, on the basis of E3C01EX data, 
•es include the whole SITC 001 sroup. 
es include the whole SITC 051 group. 
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Table .4 
COLOMBIA: AHHUAL FLUCTUATIONS EI THE KlICIS OP SCKJ (210UPS OF ElODUCTS, 1953 TO 1973 






1953 -1 .7 -3.1 21.0 . . -0.;4 -1 .6 -3.8 -3.5 1.8 
1954 28.7 ..15.2 .5.2 -4.6 H.5 -1 .3 3.2 24,3 
1955 * -13J. • 19.1 -52.2. ,2 .4 15.6 > 0.0 11.4 -11,0 
1956 -1 .9 . 61.8 -7.9 20,4 49.9 . 3.9 27.8 0.8 
1957 -1.1 9.5 -23.5 -13.1 9.5 , 2.5 6.7 1 . 2 
1958 -19.2 -37.5 413.9- -12.1 -30.5 , 0.0 -25.2 -17-5 
1959 -13.6 —23.4 -69.3- »7.6 - 2 1 . 6 0.0 -10.9 - 1 2 . 4 
i960 -0.7 • 5.1 -50.5- 135.8 -6.4 3.7 - 3.7 5.5 1 .2 
1961 .2.6 -4.8 47.2- - 2 0 . 7 24.2 -9.5 - 1 . 2 -5.8 -3.4 
1962 -7.4 5.8 36.9 20.6 16.6 . 0.0 8.5 -5.7 
1963 -1.9 - -9.5 1 2 . 7 - 1 0 . 3 12.6 -2.5 • 1 . 2 -1 .8 0.0 
1964 •• 25.4 10.5 - 1 6 . 7 2.3 - 1 0 . 0 o.l . 0.0 -3.1 16,8 
1965 - 0 . 7 • -1 .5 -36.a -3.1 ,14.0 0.3 . - - 2.3 1.2 0,2 
1966 -3.5 - -15.5 -14.6 -14.3 -35.3 -1C.6 , .. 2 . 3 -7.P -4.7 
1967 - 1 0 . 3 • 14.7 -7 .1 , 13.2 -13.0 5.4:'. l . l 3.3 - 6 . 9 
1968 0.8 • - 2 1 . 0 4.3 • 16.9 -53.8 0.5 • 0.0 -0.5 0,0 
1969 ' -0.4 - -3.1 43.9 -6.7 - 1 . 3 5.8 . , 3.3 4.0 1.9 
1970 37.4 ' • • 13.3 2.1 -11.9 ,1.8 - l . l • ; 6.4 3.1 22.0 
1971 - 1 5 . 2 -4.8 32 .9 2 1 . 5 • 3.5 15.6 . 5.0 9.0 . -6,4 
1972 " 8.4 1 . 0 22.0 25.5 .22,8 19.2 - 7.6 12.9 10,4 
1973 33.9 12.0 43.1 0.63 -6o.4 27.8 , 17.7 21.3 28.4 
197^ 2 . C 11.6 142.5 . 142.6 206.3 132.11, < 2 0 . 3 52.3 30,9 
•¿.vemse a / 
(1953^.973) 10. u 13.9 44.2 23.3 1 6 . 2 1 2 . 7 3 . 1 8,4 6,4 
a/ Equals the sum of the absolute values of the fluctuations of each year divided by the number of 
years« 1974 «as not included because of the highly unusual aire ¡instances of the world economy 
In that year. 
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Table 5 
COWSIA: GŒiPOSITiœ OF EAAT 2XPCMS 
Bananas Sugar Cotton Tobacco 
(value in 
* ~~ : : : ; ~ ; minions 
Share of total BUT ° f 
dollars) 
1952 81.0 4 . 7 0.0 14.3 1 2 . 5 
1953 61.6 ,0.1 0.0 36.3 15.7 
1954 83.8 .0.1 0.0 16.1 15.8 
1955 78.9 ' 11.1 0.0 10.0 18.5 
1956 78.0 1 3 . 7 0.0 8-3 20.8 
1957 89.3 1 , 0 >,'.•' 0.0 9.7 15.5 
1958 88.6 0.0 0.0 11.4 13.3 
1959 87.5 , 0.0 0.0 12.5 15.4 
1960 . 47.6 , . 0.0 44,2. 8.2 , 26.9 
1961. 1 5 . 3 3 1 . 4 . u « 5 34.9 
1962, 26.9 , 1 8 . 7 4o.o _ 14.4 34.9 
1963 37.5 15.5 - 2 6 . 7 • , 20.3 32.0 
1964 39.4 , 10.4 20 .2 30 ,0 : 28.5 
1965 44.6• , 18,6 1 9 . 4 17.4 
* -
37.6 
1966 ••:. 54.1 . 24.6 6.3 15.0 4i.o 
1967 . 43.3 , 22.3 26.8 7.6 60,8 
1968 3 3 . 5 21,6 3 8 . 3 , 6 , 6 77.0 
1969. 26 a. . 20.7 4 3 . 5 5.7 74,6 
1970 24.2 19.8 46,3 9.7 74,6 
1521 20.9 23.8 42.2 . „ 13.1 60,8 
1972 13.0 28.9 48.7 9.4 76.3 
1973 - 15.4 3 1 . 1 • 38.2 ' 15.3 - 56.7 
1&* 1 1 . 2 32.3 43.2 8V3 ; - 39.1 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of DANE data (Foreign Trade Yearbooks). 
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Table 6 
COLCMBIA: EXPCnT REGISTERS BROiSI DO® BY HABJ PRODUCT, 1974 AND 1 975 




























A. Coffee M * ! M - ! 1 527.6 44-2.2 6 C 0 . 5 1 537.2 M hi 0.6 
B« Main agricultural 
produots 663.6 2 2 M 442.7 1 117.7 M i l 3C2.1 68.4 45.4 
Raw sugar l40.0 87.9 627.9 197.6 Û2.5 417.5 4 l . l -6.1 -33.5 
Cotton 70.2 85.3 1 215.1 91.9 81.9 8 9 1 . 2 30.9 -4.0 -26.7 
Beef 20.4 37.1 1 306.3 30.6 36.5 1 1 9 2 . 8 7.8 -1 .6 -8 .7 
Live animals 7.8 4.8 615.4 76.2 51.6 677.2 8 7 7 . 0 975.0 10.0 
Tobacco 25.3 22.7 597.2 14.7 17.8 1 210.9 -41.9 - 2 1 . 5 35.0 
Rice , 1 .3 0.5 384.6 207.8 75.3 362,4 1 5 884.6 14 960.0 -5 .8 
Bananas 375.4 27.7 73.8 465.5 38.8 83.4 24.0 40.0 13.0 
Flowers 10.4 15.9 1 528.8 11.5 19.4 1 687.0 1 0 . 0 22.0 10.4 
Shrimps 3.1 11.5 3 709.6 2.5 1 0 . 1 4 o4o.o -19.4 -12.2 8.9 
Soybean cake 1 .7 0.4 235.3 79.4 1 3 . 2 1 6 6 . 3 4 570.6 3 200.0 -29.3 
C. Main industrial 
produots ¿ E M 204.1 392.3 Mxk l î l é 189.7 59.4 -ZM 
Cement 397.0 1 0 . 2 25.7 697.7 22.1 32.5 75.8 115.6 2 8 . 5 
Cotton fibres 14.2 41.4 2 915.5 l4.o 31.3 2 235.7 - 1 . 4 -24.4 -23.3 
Cotton yarn 12.6 19.6 1 555.6 11.7 21.8 1 863.3 -7.1 11.2 19.8 
Clothing and footwear 12.3 C2.0 6 6 6 6 . 7 2 .9 lC.9 6 517.2 76.4 -77.0 -2.2 
Cardboard boxes 35.9 11.8 328.7 42.2 lo. l 431.0 17.0 53.4 31.1 
Leather 1 .5 5.2 3 466.7 0.6 8.1 13 500.0 - 6 0 . 0 56.0 289.4 
Worked stones - 12.8 - 13.1 - 2 . 3 
Herbicides 3.0 7.4 2 466.7 1.3 4.1 3 153.9 -57.0 -44.6 27.9 
Mineral fertilizers 39.5 9.3 235.4 53.3 1 2 . 5 . 234.5 35.0 34.4 - 0 . 3 
Books and pamphlets 4.3 4.4 1 023.3 7.6 7.8 1 026.3 76.7 77.3 ,0.3 
D. Other products C3S.5 420.2 260.8 278.2 . - G . 2 -2M 
E. General total 2 4O3.0 1 499.4 3 194.8 1 536.9 hi 
Source» Coyiantura Econo'nica, Fedesarrollo, vol 6, N° 1, April 197«* 

Table 1 
COLOMBIA: BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL EXPORTS, 1970.1973 
(Volumes Met -tons. Values thousands of dollars) 



























Pood products and live animals 
Live animals 
Heat and meat preparations 
Dairy produots and eggs 
Fish and fish ^roperations 
Cereals and cereal preparations 
Bananas 
Fresh vegetables 
Other fresh fruit 
Sugar 
Sugar confectionary and other sugar preparations 
Coffee 
Tea, cocoa, spices and their preparations 
Feeding stuff for animals 
Miscellaneous food preparations 




,rude materials inedible 
Hides and skins, undressed 
Oilseeds, oil nuts and oil kernels 
Crude, rubber (synthetic and reclaimed) 
Wood in the rough 
Wood, lumber ana cork 
Pulp and waste paper 
Cotton 
Other textile fibres and their waste 
Crude fertilizers and crude minerals 
Metalliferous sinoralo and metal scrap 
Crude animal and vegetable materials n.e.s. 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 




Animal and vegetable oils and fats 
Chemicals 
Chemical elements and oompounds 
Miners! tar and crude ohemicals from coal and petroleum 
Dyeing, tanning and oolouring materials 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
Essential oils, perfume materials, etc« 
Fertilizers, manufactured 
Explosives and pyrotechnio produots 
Plastio materials 
Chemical materials and produots 
Manufactured gocda fry ir eterica. 
Leather and leather manufactures 
Rubber manufactures 
Wood and cork manufactures (excluding furniture) 
Paper, paper board and manufactures thereof 
Textile yarn iuad thread 
Cotton fabrics, woven 
Textile fabrics, wovai, other than cotton 
Small wares 
Special textile fabrics 
Made-up articles of textile materials 
Floor coverings, tapestries 
Lime and cement 
Gl&se 
Glassware 
Preoious and semipreoiouss stones 
Other mineral manufactures 
Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Manufactures of basio metals n,e,s. 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Machinery, other than electric 
Electrio machinery, apparatus and appliances 
Transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures and fittings 
Furniture 
Travel goods, handbags and similar artiolos 
Clothing 
Footwear , , , . , , : 
Scientific and controlling instruments, photo, and opt. goods, 
•watches and òlock I 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles j 
Commodities and transactions not classified according to kind 
S 052 726 
] 917 942 
! 4 6V 
32 5Î5 
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•Bible 6 
COLOMBIA: INDEATORS OP PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION a/ 





Number of produots 
Percentage of total 
Number of produots 
Percentage of total 
Number of products 
Percentage of total 
Number of produots 
Percentage of total 
50 60 70 80 90 100 
- - - 1 2 83 
1 . 2 2.4 100 
1 2 6 102 
1.0 1.9 6.0 100 
- 1 2 3 8 127 
0.8 1 .6 2.4 6 .3 100 
1 3 6 12 26 166 
0.6 1 . 8 3 .6 7 .2 15.6 100 
Souroe; CEPAL, on the basis of DANE data (Foreign Trade Yearbooks). 
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ÌNfsÒjj JÌjoNĈ l 
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COLOMBIA: STRUCTURE OP TOT̂ L; EXPORTŜ , By DESTINATION, 1952-1975 






... 1963 ... 19^7--
"1968-
.. i97i 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
Andean Group 0.8 l a 4 '2.7 7 »9 1 0 . 0 7*5 1 0 , 5 14,2 
Rest LAFTA 0.3 "0.2 '0.1 r , i . 4 '1,9 "2,4 2 . 0 3.8 3 . 2 
M3CA ' ' '0.1 
t 
"0,3 "ro,4 ""'0.8 * o<s9 * - « . s :M.2 2,0 1 . 8 
CARIFTA 0,6 ' i .4 '3.5 i '4«7 *ö,6 '0.5 0,2 0,2 
Uhited States 78.4 69 .8 58.6 " 46.5 34.1 • 3 7 . 9 37.5 33 . 1 
Rest of America' 7.6 * 6 , 6 2.2 " 2.7 ^3 .6 * 5 . 7 7.7 5 . 6 
EEC 9.8 I 6 . 0 24,6 2 6 i 8 24,6 •24.3 24,2 29.4 
Rest of Europe 2.6 "•4.5 * 8.0 13.6 1̂ 6.3 16.0 14,3 11,4 10,6 
Japan 2 / ' 0 . 2 0,8 ' 0 .9 '']2.3 3.9 4,2 1,5 1 . 5 
Rest of World " 0.1 " 0 . 2 " oe4 ' 0,4 "•"' 0 , 6 1.3 * 2.8 1,2 0,5 
Total •ioo.b joo.:o l'OQäO roo.o 100 ¿0 • 100,-0 lOQjO 100.0 100.0 
Souroe: CEPALj on the basis of DANE data (Foreign' Trade Yekriiooks)« 
a/ Less than 0*1 per oent. 
- 42 - . 
Table 11 ' ' f 
COLOMBIA: STRUCTURE OP MINOR EXPOHTS, BY DESTINATION, 1952-1975' 




' 1 9 5 9 
i960-
1963 
. 1964- 7 : 
- 1967 
,1968-"; 
, i 9 7 i 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
Andean Group 10,7 6.1» 6 .3 . 12.9 18.1 ; 20.7 17.5 22.2 30.4 
Rest UFTA 0.6 '.5 0.5 0.9 . 4 .7 , 3.6 . . 3 . 0 3 . 4 ... 4 .3 3.9 
t®CA • 3 .5 'v.i 3.9 - 3 . 3 1 . 4 . 6 v •> 3.2 2 .0 3 . 1 3.9 3 .8 
CARIFTA 0.1 0 .1 f . : ) 0 . 3 •• 0 .2 0.6 • 1 . 3 ...; 0 .4 , . 0 .5 0.5 
United States 32.0 . 24.4 l, > 30.5 , . , '27.3 ; : 24.6 - 2 1 . 2 , 25.0 . 28.9 26.1 
Rest of America 8 .3 2.3 • 3 .7 • 6 .4 . 8.7 13.9 13.2 11 .2 t -. <, 
CEE ,40 .8 . • 5 0 . 7 • 48.6 ; . 36.7 i 25.3 >.  l 8 « 3 , . 21.6 * * 18 .3 18.4 
Rest of Europe 2.0 ^ ' 1 0 . 0 • 2.7 ; 4.7 , 10.8 13.4 ; 8 . 1 . 6 .6 4 .4 
Japan . 0.2 .. ' 0 . 1 . 1 .2 0 0 .9 'V 3*6 3.2 3.2 1*2 0.8 
Rest of World 1 .8 . 1 . 6 .. 2 .5 • 1 . 6 1 .3 3 .0 s.-. 5 , 6 0.9 0 .5 
Total ., 100.0 . 100.0 100.0 .. • . ¿ 2 M 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of DANS data (Foreign Tr&cle Ye&rbooks). . 
- 4-3 -
Table 12 
COLOMBIA! STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS By EXPORTING COMPANY, 1974 a/ 
Exports Number of Value Percentage 
(thousands of dollars) companies (millions of dollars) share 
50 to 99.9 234 16 639 1 .9 
100 to 199.9 204 29 165 3 .5 
200 to 499.9 217 69 382 8 .2 
500 to 999.9 102 60 066 7 . 1 
1 000 to 9 999.9 146 379 188 44.9 
10 000 and over 14 290 485 34.4 
Total 2 1 1 844 925 100.0 
Souroe; INCOMES export registers, 1974« 
a/ Companies vhleh exported goods worth over 50 000 dollars in 1974* The exports 
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(contant prices) 
1970 = 100 
Figure 1 
COLOMBIA: EXPORT TRENDS, 1952 - 1973 Total 
\ Mayor 
export 








COLOMBIA: LORENZ CURVE OF EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION BY PRODUCT 
Value of exports (per cent) 
(per cent) 
Source: CEPAL^ on the basis of DANE data (Foreign Trade Yearboocks). 
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SNLARH-UiiiD SECTION OF FIGUIG 3 
/Chapter I I I 
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• .. Chapter I I I . 
THE PROMOTION. SYSTEM: ..ANALYSIS OF THE INSTRUMENTS USED 
Towards the end of the 19*K)s Colombia adopted the f i r s t 
measures designed to promote minor exports, a policy which has 
undergone considerable modifications s,ince then» This chapter 
examines the evolution of development pol icy , highlighting the more 
important features of the. d i f f e rent promotion machinery• used» The 
instruments which w i l l be studied are: .those included in exchange 
po l i cy ( f i x ed and multiple rates of exchange, and programmed 
devaluations), import pol icy (exemption systems applicable to the 
imports of inputs and capital goods), f i s ca l pol icy (tax exemptions, 
direct f i s c a l incent ives) , finance policy (advance refunds, pre- and 
post-shipping c red i t s ) , marketing policy (PKOEXPO) and access and 
negotiation pol icy (Andean Pact, LAFTA)=l/ : 
The analysis covers four subperiods., .which include as many . 
other stages in the evolution in export policy» The cut-of f points 
f o r the periods, from 19^8 onwards,.are 1959, 1967-and 197^« 
1. The f i r s t steps: 19^8-1959 ;J "'" ' 
The f i r s t attempts to implement an.export promotion pol icy 
were made in 19^8. The, e f f o r t was a modest one, and was l imited to 
reducing the quantitative restr ic t ions imposed on exports and 
establishing a preferent ia l exchange rate for minor exports, which 
was cal led "cer t i f i cados de cambio de mercado l ibre"o2/ The new 
exchange pol icy proved a major incentive for minor exports. In fact 
during.the second half of 19^8, these exports enjoyed a rate of 
exchange 57 per cent higher than that received by other exports» 
1/ The methodological criteria used in this section are described 
in R» French-Davis and J. Pinera, op»cit., Chapter III» 
2/ Decree 19^9, of June 19^8» 
/As in 
- 50 - . 
As in other countries of the region, the exchange policy-
underwent drastic and continuous modifications during the fol lowing 
20 years, and only as recently as 196? was i t s tabi l i zed. As a 
result of this uncertainty, the conditions under which exports 
developed changed frequently, in respect of,both the procedure for 
f i x ing the rates and the l eve l of such rates. 1/ The successive 
po l i c i es included, a l ternate ly , examples such as a single f ixed 
rate and regimes of multiple rates, with a f ree rate for minor 
exports» By way of example, the f ree exchange pol icy introduced in 
19^8 was suspended in March 1951 when ..a s ingle rate was f ixed for 
a l l exports and imports at a much-lower l eve l than that in force at 
the time, a pol icy which is the opposite of the immediately preceding 
one. 
Apart from the swings between the extreme exchange, po l i c i es 
mentioned, there are two aspects to which attention should, be drawn. 
On one hand, the establishment in July 1952 of a ''system of export • ' 
vouchers", which remained in force for ; almost-three years,: and which 
allowed their holders to import prohibited goods, part icular ly 
luxury consumer goods. On . the other in 1957 a;.tax was,. f ixed on 
exports, which lasted unt i l 1962. 
The system of export vouchers provided an implic i t subsidy for 
those who exported goods included in a l i s t of items cdvering almost 
a l l the minor exports. The size of the subsidy or bonus depended on 
the gap between: domestic demand and supply for the imported restr ic ted 
goods which could be brought in with the vouchers in question. 
Therefore, the s ize of the incentive to the exporter was determined 
by the scarcity price of those goods, in other words, i t was d i rect ly 
linked to the intensity of the restr ic t ions in force in the general 
system on the imports of those goods. In turn, to the extent that 
the exporter could use the product of his sales in purchasing prohibited 
1/ For an outline of the successive changes recorded in this 
period, see J.D. Teigeiro and R.A. Elson, "El crecimiento 
de las éxpbr-táciones menores y el" ¡sistema dé fomentó", de la 
exportación en Colombia",' Fedégarrbilo, July 1973« 
/imports, an 
- 51 - . 
imports, an a r t i f i c i a l l y low import exchange rate tended to improve 
his posit ion instead of weakening i t as fore ign ar t i c l es grew 
scarcer.1/ In fac t , i t i s known that an.excessively undervalued 
exchange rate usually•leads to a strentheping of non-tar i f f 
restr ic t ions on imports of non-essential and luxury goods, thereby 
decreasing the ava i l ab i l i t y of such goods.. The "export vouchers" 
were negotiable and were transferred at ,s i zable premiums, which 
amounted to an average of kO per;cent during the period August to 
December 1952.2/ < . • • -
The other outstanding feature noted,during this f i r s t phase, 
is the introduction in 1957- of a. direct tax of 15 per cent on to ta l 
exports, which was established with.the view,,to co l lec t ing funds fo r 
servicing the external debt accumulated in the preceding year. 
After three months, in September that year, the rate was reduced to 
2 per cent for minor exports, a l eve l which was maintained up to 
1961.3/ 
The def in i t ion of "minor exports", favoured by the promotion 
pol icy , was changed on various occasions. The de f in i t ion which 
predominated was that which covered a l l expdits, with the exception 
of co f f e e , bananas, o i l and untarined hides. However-, on various'' 
occasions the last tHree items were included among'minor exports, 
sometimes including precious metals. The main-criterion used in 
defining them was that of favouring "new" exports compared with 
tradit ional ones, without any consideration as to how they should 
be ident i f i ed . 
1/ Normally, the maintenance of a low rate of exchange meant the 
accentuation.of quantitative restr ic t ions rather than an 
indiscriminate expansion in imports. The main exceptions 
occurred during periods in which world prices for co f fee were 
favourable. 
2/ The premium reached an average of 1 peso per dol lar . See 
Teigeiro and Elso, op . c i t . , . t ab l e 2. The premium depended 
. .. on the expected p ro f i t margin of the importers. 
2/ The rate of taxation remained at 15 per cent for co f f e e , bananas, 
and precious metals. 
/Broadly speaking, 
- 52 - . 
Broadly speaking, during thè sùbperiod, from 19^8 to 1959, 
there was no systematic promotion policy.. Thé most important 
incentive, the export voucher, was 'an indirect mechanism, whose 
incidence for the exporter was not very-clear; rather than being 
a stable and permanent incentive i t was' a temporary pa l l i a t i v e to r 
the losses in the purchasing power'of the exchange rate, and an 
encouragement to greater exports at times when there were balahce-
of-payments problems- Furthermore,'the exchange" pol icy was known 
for i t s ins tab i l i t y , in terms of both the rules of access and the 
rate of foreign exchange. Aïs a resul t , during these years no 
attempt was made to establish any specif i t instrument which would ••• 
provide de f in i t e guidelines f o i encouraging the creation of productive 
capacity directed towards external markets. •">•" • 
2. Customs and t a r i f f exemptions: 1959-196? 
In the last years of the 1950s po l ic ies were introduced which 
enjoyed a greater degree of permanence .and,.they are s t i l l being 
used, to some extent, to day. .. The most d is t inct ive feature i s to 
be found in the, tax and.customs exemptions established,in favour of 
minor exports. In January 1959 a system.of franchises was introduced 
for imports of inputs, required for the, production o f export goods,1/ 
known as the Vai le jo Plan.2/ Later on, in I960, a. new incentive 
was adopted under which the p ro f i t s from export a c t i v i t i e s were 
exempt from income, tax. r 
( a ) Import franc hi ses and t he Va i le jo „Plan " ' 
The Vai le jo Plan consists mainly in a system of import franchises 
applicable to: rjaw^materiaJLs, intermediate and capital goods which 
was open to those enterprises producing export goods. The.system 
1/ Since 1956, at l east , there have been export incentives 
consisting in tax r e l i e f and the l i f t i n g of „restrictions on the 
imports of inputs. See Carlos Díaz-Alejandró, "Las exportaciones 
menores colombianas", ^edesarroil0, January¡ 1973» 
2/ Law of 1959, ar t i c l es 55 to 60. 
/operates on 
- 53 - . 
operates on the basis of "import-export programmes" which are designed 
to benef i t those enterprises: ( i ) "which have id le capacity in 
their plant, owing to the lack of national consumption or the 
scarcity of foreign raw materials".,, or ( i i ) whose instal led capacity 
"should be increased . . . so that increases in production could be 
set aside fo r exports". 1/ : • 
The primary object ive - the explo.itation,. of instal led capacity -
i s that which assumed greater importance during the period under 
review, although i t was not, expressly covered by: the instruments 
which, were used. When used in manufturing goods for export, the 
imports required by these enterprises., enjoy exemptions from customs 
duties, and are also exempt from the obligation of making advance 
deposits and from the -procedures of obtaining prior impor l icenses; 
the exemptions were extensive, even in respect of ;those, goods which 
were restr ic ted. The exemption frpm the payment of import taxes, 
was somewhat similar to drawback;2/ however, the l i f t i n g of ., the 
other restr ic t ions operated-dif ferently» . Colombian imports were 
o f f and on subject to the: payment. of .deposits in advance and 
restr ic t ions on entry. The lat ter , covered prohibited goods, qpota.s. 
and involved procedures;which made import operations a;time-consuming 
process. ThevVallejo Plan, therefore, helped the exporters to 
eliminate costs, quantitative l imitat ions and save time, ;advantages 
which aye?hot usually associated with a drawback system. 
In order to-be ent i t led to these benef i ts , the enterprises had 
tb enter into an import-export contract with the corresponding public 
inst i tut ion,3/ under which-,the former undertook to e f f e c t certain 
exports, to obtain.credit in foreign exchange for financing imports, 
1/ Art ic les 55 and 56, Law of 1959. • 
2/ From the f inancial point of view, the Val le jo Plan d i f f e red 
from the tradit ional drawback system in that under the former 
the exporter was exempted from paying import taxes, whereas in 
the case of the l a t t e r , the taxes are paid on the entry of the 
goods and are refunded la ter . 
3/ The Ministry of Development at the beginning, INCOMEX at present. 
/and to 
and ta. use these imports only fo r the manufacture of goods for 
externa^ markets» In order to check on compliance with these 
provisions, the enterprises are obliged to keep a ledger in which 
they must record the imports of inputs and the quantities used in 
manufacturing the products exported. To guarantee their compliance 
with these undertakings, they must, in addition, provide a bank 
guarantee equivalent to double the customs duties which apply to 
those items under the general system,of .imports. 
The two main features of the Vai le jo Plan are that the incentive 
to exports i s in direct proportion to the import component contained 
in each one, and to the intensity of trade restr ic t ions l i f t e d in 
respect of this component. The argument in favour of this machinery 
is that i t i s designed to reduce the repercussions on the cost of 
production of export goods caused by import substitution. That 
r e f l e c t s a l imited view of the economy, which only considers,, the 
impact on the l eve l of exports., ; A correct „assessment of. the e f f e c t s 
of the Vai le jo Plan and of its. social impact % however, has to be 
arrived at by.comparing..it with a s i tuat ion. in which ân attempt i s 
made to ajpply a general economic, policy, which covers in. a coherent 
manner not only the development of . ,.ex:p.ort9,but also., their. ,,r 
repercussions on the remainder, of the. economy, including import 
substitution. ... ... <. . : 
Owing, to the. intr insic nature of the. Vai le jo Plan, it., prpvides 
a greater incentive, to produce l ines of goods which require a high 
proportion of. foreign inputs; therefore, to the extent that substitution 
is technical ly poss ib l e , . i t tends to promote the substitution of 
national.components by. imported ones.l/ Nevertheless, substitution 
1/ A study of the poss ib i l i t i e s of substitution is found in 
Antonio Urdinola and Richard Mallon, "Po l i c ies to Promote 
Colombian Exports of Manufacturés", Economic Development Report 
NQ 75t Centre for International A f f a i r s , Harvard"University, 
September 1967. The degree of subst i tutabi l i ty , has been l imited 
par t ia l l y by the exclusion of imports of goods in respect of which 
national production in terms of supply and quality i s adequate. 
Apart from the lax application of this clause, which makes i t f a i l 
as an incentive to the present production of these goods, the 
Va i l e jo Plan reduces opportunities for f inding new substitutes for 
imported components. 
/takes place 
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takes place among industries rather than within each act iv i ty , , thereby 
promoting the development of,those goods which,are import-component 
intensive. The increase in,the weighting pf the l a t t e r in industrial 
production raises-the average import coe f f i c i en t of the sector. 
Secondly, the size o f the .franchise granted by the Val le jo Plan depends 
on the general import policy^. In other words, the greater the 
restr ic t ions in force in the ger^erfl system applied to purchase 
abroad, the greater w i l l be the import pr iv i l eges enjoyed by the 
exporter. 1/ 
. The Val le jo Plan is l imited t-p -the promotion of exports of 
manufactured goods. In view, of -its complexity, the system was, in 
addition not accessible to the.small and medium-sized enterprises*2/ 
of special importance was the need- to^ have prior external financing 
which was an; acute constraint -for,Jt^e., new.'smaller enterprises, and 
so too was the need t-p secure a-buy;er .abroad in advance. Furthermore, 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to exercise e f f e c t i v e control on the use of foreign 
components, part icularly as regards those firms which, also operate 
in the domestic market, -have:.a-diversified production,., and which use 
a wide variety of inputs. Finally,. the machinery used imposes a dual 
'price system, ;.which^discriminates against that part of production . 
destined for the .national, market. : In „other words, , the same product 
is e f f ec ted .by, d i f f e rent input costs depending on whether, i t i s for 
the .domestic or -the external market. This obviously operates, against 
the. Integrated development, of the national economy. 
The Val le jo Plan was in moderate use during the f i r s t year of 
operation. However, as from the mid-1970s i t s use spread rapidly 
and i t eventually covered most of the exports of manufactures. The 
average imported export component which benefited from these exemptions 
1/ I t i s easy to see that normally, in circvimstances such as 
those which have governed the foreign trade of Latin American 
countries in '"thé' industr ial izat ion process, l ibera l i zed 
imports enjoy coiiditionê öf entry which are even more favourable 
than those which would apply in a f ree trade system. 
2/ This conclusion is reached by Diazr.Alejandro, and Teigeiro and 
Elson. 
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was more than kO per cent of the gross value of these exports, a 
f igure much higher than the corresponding import coe f f i c i en t for 
Colombian industrial production taken as a whole,, which was estimated 
at 13 per cent . l/ The compensation represented by the exemption from 
customs duties and advanced deposits, which -exports covered by the 
Vai le jo Plan enjoy, i s estimated at an average' of. between 9 and 12 per 
cent of the "gross value of these exports. 2/ -In other words, these 
import exemptions are equal to an increase, rin the export rate of 
exchange by the percentages just mentioned.3/ 
The study of the e f f e c t of the application of the Va i l e j o Plan 
has been carried out in the preceding l ines , by comparing i t , with the 
situation exist ing prior to i t s introduction» The argument s t i l l holds 
good that in the past, the in i t i a t i on of the import substitution process 
made the industries using the .inputs bear their, cost. The Vai le jo Plan 
was concerned with avoiding .'this; impact on the cost of pr.oductionof 
exports; but the machinery used has; caused the production o f national 
inputs to be, an general, l imited to the demand for the domestic market. 
Thus, the contrasts between import substitution pol ic ies.and export 
promotion po l i c i es were starkly, revealed.. A pol icy designed to achieve 
integrated economic development, on ..the other hand, makes i t . possible 
for ' these two. aspects of external trade pol icy to complement each 
other. This seems to be;/totally viable to the extent, that import 
substitution i s based on "reasonable", l eve ls of protection, in which 
the exporters help in generating demand fo r components of national 
1/ ... Diaz-Ale j,andro, oj^cjLt»,, The coe f f i c i en t of the enterprises 
covered by the Vai le jo Plan includes a l l direct imports 
'••- e f f ec ted by them. . •••., -
2/ This does not include estimates at to the value represented by 
the exemption from the need to procure l icenses in advance and 
the bans on' imports. ...; 
3/ I f the import rate of exchange were raised simultaneously in 
order to maintain e f f e c t i v e protection of the national added 
value, i t would ca l l for a higher increase in the exchange rate. 
In the example given in the tex t , the increase required would 
range between 18 and 25 per cent. 
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or ig in as well as ac t i v i t i e s which produce for the domestic market, 
and exporters receive compensation.,.through a direct mechanism for 
the burden of costs which they have to bear by purchasing the ir 
inputs.1/ In. the f i na l chapter of this document a great deal more 
w i l l be said on this.subject. 
(b ) Tax exemptions 'aiid Ar t i c l e 120 
In I960 a new export incentive was approved, under a r t i c l e 120 of 
Law 8lo I t consisted in the exemption from income tax of p ro f i t s 
generated by minor exports.2/ 
Since the export enterprises also operated, in general, to 
sa t i s f y domestic demand,.it i s considered d i f f i c u l t to determine what 
part of the p ro f i t s corresponded to .sales in one market or the other. 
Therefore, a presumed level., of,, prof its., equal to 40 per cent of the • •.... 
gross value of exports, was established.. Enterprises were authorized 
to deduct from their to.t.al p ro f i t that, presumed income. Since this ; 
was an over-estimate, part icularly in respect of act iv i t ies , showing 
l i t t l e ve r t i ca l integration, which were cegrried out by a. single 
jur id ica l unit, in practice, this promotion machinery also served to 
reduce the tax burden on that, part, of production reserved.for. the 
domestic market; in the, caseo f enterprises, special iz ing in,,export, 
production, the tax exemption in question encouraged their 
d ivers i f i ca t ion towards, the domestic market or the transfer of export 
operations to middle-men.3/ I t is interesting to note that these two 
side e f f e c t s represented the opposite of the Val le jo Plan; this tended 
1/ See a theoret ical discussion on this aspect of import pol icy in 
Ffrench-Davis and Pinera, £P»,cit . , September 1976. 
2 j Defined as a l l exports with the exception of co f f e e , o i l and 
i t s by-products, bananas and untanned hides-. 
3/ The export enterprises which had no production l ines for the 
domestic market could not take f u l l advantage of the system, 
except that they obtained from their expo.rts a net p r o f i t of 
ko per cent of the gross value. A way of avoiding the problem 
raised was to export through middlemen who .carried out these 
operations for the national market. 
/to segregate 
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to segregate production on the basis of the market of destination 
and encouraged the producer of 'the exportable goods to develop 
para l l e l marketing a c t i v i t i e s . ; 
The equivalent of the subsidy provided by this instrument 
depended on the rate of income tax to which the exporting enterprise 
was subject. This rate varied depending on the nature of the 
jur id ica l person. I f an average rate of 35 per cent i s taken,!/ the 
exemption represents additional tax- free income for the exporter of 
l*f per cent. 2/ 
( c ) Other promotion machinery , 
The customs and tax exemptions are the möst .important elements 
of the export promotion policy--in force between 1959 and 1967«: 
However, in this period other important instruments were used» 
The most innovative of a l l was the>-'"advance refund", which in 
addition to promoting exports attempted to attract external funds 
which would strengthen the bálárice-of-payments posit ion. Under this 
system,the exporter could; i f hé' enjoyed access to.external cred i t , 
contract debts abroad lip to "the value of his future exports.' What 
the loan produced was;changed in the Bank of the Republic to finance 
his production costs iff hational currency the amortization of the 
external credit was E f fec ted with the payment which'he received l a t e r 
on his export's ó At f i r s t s ight, i t seems a- simple pre-shipment cred i t , 
the dist inct ion being that i t i s financed from abroad. -However, the 
procedure used also .implied a subsidy linked to the nominal increases 
1/ This f igure coincides with the estimates of Di^z-Alejandro and 
Teigeiro and Elson. 
2/ The incentive, provided, in a r t i c l e 120 is equal to an increase 
in the export rate of exchange of 21.6 per cent. With a tax 
ráté of 35 peí" cent the increase i s distributed on 'the basis 
of 7 = 6 per cent for the revenue authorities and 14- per cent for 
the exporter. I t should be borne in mind, nevertheless, that 
the incentive is d i f f e red* since i t consists in the exemption 
from taxes which are paid a f te r the accounting period i s 
completed. 
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in the rate of exchange which were to be recorded during the period 
covered by the operation« In f ac t , when the. de f in i t i ve refund was 
made a f i na l rel iquidation was e f fected at the rate of exchange in 
force on* the day i t was made. As a result , the exporter who had 
received Colombian currency in advance!,, and,. therefore, had made 
use of those funds during the period between the provisional 
l iquidation and the reliquidation:,was able to obtain greater, real 
income equal to the re l iquidat ion in cases where the exchange rate 
had increased; the opposite would occur in the case of a revaluation.1/ 
However, in view of the swings in exchange policy during this period 
no importance was attached to the system unti l 1967, from which time 
on i t s use continued to spread unti l 1972. 
A further important aspect was linked with an innovation in 
exchange po l icy , ef fected, in 1959., which attempted to exclude 
manufactures- with a high import-component content from, the pre ferent ia l 
exchange rates then in , force for minor exports;2/ thus, exports which 
received better treatment under,, the., Val le jo Plan could not at the . same 
time enjoy the exchange incentive. Attempts were, therefore, made 
to mitigate the inherent bias in the,promotion system in favour o f 
the development of ac t i v i t i e s which were foreign-component intensive. 
1/ The exporter 's net p ro f i t i s equa l t o the real value of the 
' rel iquidation in cases where the cost for"him of the external 
-cred i t - i s equal-to the returns he gets-on ^he investment of 
funds in the domestic market. In cases where the net p r o f i t 
d i f f e r s from this f igure , there are f i v e variables which 
determine the s ize of the net p ro f i t received by the exporter 
thanks to the advance refunds. These are the rate of interest 
of foreign credi t , the nominal domestic rate of interest , the 
rate of in f l a t i on , the variation in the rate of exchange, and 
the period of the operation. 
2/ As from August 1959 exports with an import content higher than 
per cent were excluded; this percentage was :increased to 
. 5 0 per cent as from March 1961.. Note that the average import 
coe f f i c i en t of enterprises covered by the Val le jo Plan was in 
the region 40 per cent. 
/This law 
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This law designed to promote a higher percentage of national value 
added in exported goods continued in force up to August 1966.1/ 
As pointed out above, up to 1967 ins tab i l i t y was a permanent 
feature of exchange policy» In general, from January 1963 onwards 
f ixed exchange rates were applied to 'minor exports» Exceptionally, 
from October 1964 to June 1965 the pre ferent ia l rate : of exchange 
was f ree . In view of the sharp increase in rates during those 
months, the nominal market rate had' doubled by theènd of this short, 
period - the Banco de la República intervened again d i rec t ly , f i x ing 
i t at a l e ve l which was almost 30 per cent lower than the f r e e 
market rate. This rate of 13»50 Colombian pesos to the dol lar was 
frozen unt i l the exchange reform in 1967; that is* for a period of 
two years. 
Lastly, i t should be mentioned that in I960 thè Treaty of 
Montevideo was signed which established thè Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA), which Colombia joined in 1961» In the 
fol lowing years, part icularly between 1962 and 1964 Colombia received 
several concessions on some exports, tradit ional or new, which 
enabled i t to intensi fy i t s trade flows with the member countries 
of LAFTA.2/ 
In b r i e f , during the subperiod 1959-1967, greater importance 
was attached to export po l icy . The main instruments used were 
pre ferent ia l rates of exchange, tax and customs exemptions. The 
application of the f i r s t incentive varied widely, showing a pattern 
similar to that of the two preceding years, whereas the last two, 
which were established at the beginning of this phase, were maintained 
without s igni f icant modifications throughout the period. In general, 
the various instruments used, pursued the indiscriminate promotion 
of exports, without-weighting the side e f f e c t s that such exports 
1/ The abrogation of this law in 1966 meant for the exports 
benef i t ing from i t a drastic increase of 50 per cent in the 
exchange rate. 
2/ See INTAL, La integración económica de América Latina; r e a l i -
zaciones , problemas perspectivas, Buenos Aires, 19€>8T 
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could produce» In part icular, the Val le jo Plan encouraged the 
development of exports which were import-component intensive» A part ia l 
correction of that defect was the ljaw on exchange policy which, during 
the years' 1959 and 1966, attempted to exclude from the benef i ts of the 
pre ferent ia l exchange rates those exports with a negl ig ib le national 
value added» 
The 1967 ..reform:, DecreerLaw W * . , 
-, In 1967" substantial innovations Were introduced in the foreign 
•trade system,-which coverèd the irapôrt/export régimes, movements of 
capital,;..and exchange rates. The 'corpus jur is which fijced the new 
dispositions was the Decree-Làw kkk, of March 1967» 
The principal changes relat ing to exports were the introduction of 
a new exchange pol icy , the replacement of the tax exemption established 
in I960 by a direct subsidy (CAT), an extension of the Val le jo Plan, and 
the establishment o f ' thé Export promotion Fund (PROEXPO). 
( a ) The new 
After a long period of, successive-modifications in the Exchange 
régime, which culminated in June. 1965 with the establishment of a: f ixed 
rate, for minor exports,.a new exchange policy was introduced in Apri l 
1967 xirhich has remained basically, the same to date. 1/ I t s main feature 
consisted in continuous small adjustments in the exchange rate which 
were t ied to the rate of in f la t i on . In this way, they avoided sharp 
çhanges in.pr ice relationships caused by both massive devaluations of 
fjjçed nominal rates and the ins tab i l i t y characteristic of the periods 
in which the f ree market exchange rate prevailed. 2/ The policy which led 
to greater real s t ab i l i t y in the exchange rate was extended to cpver 
m^jor exports, maintaining, nonetheless, in e f f e c t a lower rate of 
f o r such exports.5/ 
1/ From January 1959, for a few months, a policy which showed some 
s imi lar i ty . to. thgit introduced in 1967 was applied.' See 
Diaz Alejandro, op_o_cit. 
2/ Note,, for example, the periods running from June 19^8 to March 
1951 and from October 196^ to June 1965» 
3/'.. The exceptions were the application of a nominal f ixed rate for o i l 
" and the appliqation. of a tax-on the. export refunds on co f f ee which 
. '".''were.., i n i t i a l l y , established at; 22-per centf apart from the points 
s e t ' a s i d e f o r the.National Cpffee Fundi. " y 1967 
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From 1967 Colombia" fpllowed an exchange pol icy of mini-devaluations 
designed to maintain a mote stablOrbal rate and"'to establish equilibrium 
in the balance of'payments'in the medium term; in other words, i t 
attempted to regulate the l eve l of the rate of exchange in accordance 
with the expected l eve ls of imports and exports, f ree of short-term 
fluctuations. However, in fact the pol icy was not systematic. The 
frequency and persistence of mini-devaluations was maintained from 
1967 onwards, but this did not completely avoid the fluctuations in the 
real exchange rate in response to the short-term variations experienced 
in co f f e e prices. Furthermore> the speed of the adjustment in the 
exchange rate was also influenced by considerations of a monetary nature. 
Thus for example, in periods of expansion in the means of payment, which 
were considered excessive by the Monetary Board, and when the 
international volume of reserves permitted i t , the ra^e of the Exchange 
Cer t i f i ca t e was readjusted at a slower rate than that of in f l a t i on ; this 
helped to mitigate monetary pressures and those df o.veirall demand, but 
at the same time ;the s tab i l i t y in the-real exchange rate^was undermined. 
Exchange policy- is. a global instrument which has a g r e a t impact 
on-external trade.and d irect ly a f f e c t the valuation at.market prices of 
the value added generated in exports and-in import substitution. I t i s , 
therefore, .necessary that the l eve l of the exchange rate- be adequate 
and that i t s f luctuation round the trend should not be too great in order 
to avoid the creation; of uncertainty as regards price relationships 
between national and foreign goods. Greater .stabi l i ty in these 
relationships avoids erroneous investment decisions and has a l imit ing 
• e f f e c t on.-hedging .operations»!/. I t is,therefore., preferable to use the 
policy of international reserves and, external debt as a means of 
cushioning the impact of the ups and downs in the world economy 
(part icular ly those re lat ing to co f f ee pr ices ) , without transferring to 
the domestic market contradicting signals.which are harmful to the 
correct al locat ion of the real resources of the economy. 
1/ I t ip interest ing to note that during periods of high co f f ee prices 
in.which the exchange rate was continually readjusted at a slower 
rate than internal in f l a t i on , the external debt of the private 
¡sector tended to increase. This was due, in part , to-the fact that 
' the real cost of external, credit v/as cheaper thanks to tfye slower 
rate in devaluation. In such circumstances the flow of short-term 
capital proves to be a destabi l iz ing factor . (h\ 
- 63 -
(b ) The "CAT" 
The franchise which consisted in the exemption of the export 
enterprises which benefited from i t from income tax was cancelled 
and replaced by a direct incentive. This was f ixed at 15 per cent 
of the value of sales abroad, a rate which was considered similar 
to that provided under the previous system. The new system eliminated 
some of the de f ic ienc ies of the previous, one; in part icular, i t had 
the clear advantage of being easy to administer, being d irect , and 
of not distort ing the operations of the export enterprises in the 
manner described in the previous section. 
The incentive was granted in the form of a document called 
Cert i f icado .de Abono Tributario (CAT), which i t . was possible to use 
to pay taxes e i ther on income, sales, or. on imports. The'CAT was 
issued for a percentage of the value of minor exports which in 
19.67 were defined as a,ll exports, .with the exception of co f f ee o i l 
and i t s by-products, and ¡Untanned hides - expressed in each case in 
pesos at the existing rate of exchange. . The c e r t i f i c a t e s are issued 
to bearer and do not. constitute taxable income, thus the income of 
the export enterprise; i s .exempt from taxation.. The Executive reserves 
the right, to change the rate a$d the redemption period of the 
c e r t i f i c a t e s . In 1967,.. the rate was f ixed at 15 per cent, and a ' 
compulsory holding period of one year before the documents -could be 
used to pay the taxes owing by the bearer was f i xed . This holding 
period was f ixed f o r f i s c a l reasons, and i t was pointed out that i t 
would be reduced in .the. future, when the budgetary situation improved., 1/ 
I t can be seen that the equivalent exchange rate of the present value 
of the c e r t i f i c a t e i s higher than the nominal rate (par value), owing 
1/ The purpose of this provision was to prevent the f i s ca l budget 
from being e f fec ted in the year in which the. system was changed, 
from the simultaneous impact of tjie CA? and the franchises granted 
., under Ar t i c l e 1^0. Thus, for example, the f i s ca l franchises 
which f e l l due fo r exporters in the. accounting year 19.66 had to 
be paid i^ the tax year 1967?" therefore, in this period there was 
the corresponding drop in tax revenue? To be more precise 
Ar t i c l e 120 regained in force f o r exports dispatched up to 
21 March 1967, • ' 
/to the 
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to the tax exemption which i t enjoys, whereas i t i s smaller owing to 
the compulsory holding period» The e f f e c t of the f i r s t . f e a tu r e , just 
as the franchise under Ar t i c l e 120 of Law 8l of I960, depends on the 
tax rate of the enterprise holding the c e r t i f i c a t e ; ássuming an 
average rate of 35 per cent, the CAT i s equal to an e f f e c t i v e tax 
bonus of 23 per cent. I t s e f f e c t i v e value depends, furthermore," oh•-> 
the.length of the.holding period and the nominal interést rate. : In; 
fact i since the CAT i s granted fo r an amount f ixed in national' 
currency, its-present value varies inversely to the rea l " interest 
rate and the rate of in f l a t i on recprded during the holding period. 
In general terms, the e f f e c t i v e incentive provided by the CAT 'was 
approximately similar to that provided under Ar t i c l e 120. 
From October 1967 onwards, the c e r t i f i c a t e s were deált with in 
the stock exchanges of Bogotá and Medellin; and i t ' i s interest ing: to 
ncite that they made up a high proportion o í the''operations carried 
out in those inst i tut ions. Their price does not completely-ref lect 
the benef i t received by the exporter, since i t i s determined only by 
the par value less the f inancial discount f o r the holding period. 
The advantage of building, up non-taxable income f o r the ejipofcter i s 
not re f l ec ted by the stock exchange price, since that'-''-only- 'favours 
the in i t i a l , hplder. 
Although the Government has re la t i ve l y wide powers to modify the 
cover.and rate of th is incentive, the operational rules of CAT remained 
unchanged up to the end of 1974, with a fev; exceptions. "The-m,ain one 
i s that the, holding period was reduced, f i r s t to 9 ponths in 1970, and 
la ter there was- a further reduction' in 1972. On the second occasion, 
minpr exports were divided into two groups:' "processed products", the 
holding period fo r which was reduced to three months, and the remainder 
remained subject to a holding period of s ix months.l/ Furthermore, the 
system was subject to two modifications, which .made i t somewhat more 
' • 1 '••"•»." y 
1/: In 1973 an attempt was made to extend to a l l a l ike a waiting 
period of 11 months. The measure ..was adopted and abrogated 
.-:• immediately. 
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se lec t i ve . In the series of changes recorded in 1975 a clause was 
introduced which established that the CAT would be granted to exports 
covered by the Val le jo Plan only i f the importéd components represented 
less than 60 per cent of their value." Secondly, in January 197^, the 
rate of the CAT was reduced to 1 per cent in the case of some exports 
considered undesirable owing to their e f f e c t s on domestic'supplies, 
or those considered of low pr ior i ty because of their l imited value 
added, or those which no longer needed incentives for sales abroad.1/ 
Ignoring the incidence of thè variations in the holding period, 
of l i qu id i t y , and the rate of in f l a t i on , the s tab i l i t y of the incentive 
provided by the CA.T, and the wide range of exports covered by this 
instrument, made i t s impact in practice somewhat similar to a highër 
exchange rate compared with the refunds on minor exports??/ 
In contrast, i t should be pointed Out that the use of f i s c a l 
incentives i s recommendable when the discriminate promotion of exports 
i s desired - a given region, sector, product or the use of p. given 
factor of production since with thé rate of exchange, precisely 
because of i t s overa l l application, i t i s not possible to. d i f f e r en t ia t e 
on the basis of the attributes mentioned above. I t i s f o r this reason, 
that f i s ca l tax and subsidy policy can'supplement the exchange rate -
by introducing a certain degree of s e l ec t i v i t y in the export promotion 
system in accordance with the objectives of national development. 
During this period, the CAT suffered from several defects» • Thè 
f i r s t i s that i t stimulated the tota l value of production and not the 
value added, by introducing a bias in favour of those products which 
included a high l eve l of imported components 5 therefore, the e f f e c t i v e 
incentive ( to value added.) was greater the smaller the percentage 
1/ The Board has the power to modify the rate of the ÓAT but not to 
supress i t . A similar situation has existed in the l eg i s la t i on 
of other Latin American countries» 
2/ Note that i t d i f f e r s from a singlé ráte of exchange for trade in 
goods in thtat i t only a f f e c t s minor exports, but not their inputs: 
i t constitutes non-taxable income, a$d i t s e f f e c t i v e value i s 
a f fected by the rate of in f la t ion» '•' 
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covered by national value added; furthermore, i t also applied to . 
those exports which already benefited-from the franchises provided 
under the Val le jo Plan, resulting-, therefore, in an overlapping...of 
incentives« In addition» the. CAT d^d. not-discriminate on the basis 
,PÍ desirable attr ibutes, expept between major and minor exports,, and 
exceptional capes such as those observed, in l?7X and 1974.». , Since the 
CAT was equal to a higher export rate,,of exchange, without a counterpart 
tax on imports, i t had the disadvantage of,generating a f i s ca l cost. 
When this, pol icy was introduced minor exports were not.substantial 
so that th.3 to ta l amount of. the f i s ca l incentive involved,was small» 
But i t waa precisely the marked increase in minoa? exports which caused 
the corresponding outflow to,begin to have considerable,repprpussions 
on thfe national budget... ... ., ,, 
Furthermore, the C£T was objected to hy some countrples which 
imported Colombian products,, since i t represented a "subsidy", which 
weakened the posit ion of some national exports. As a..result ,pf th is , 
they were open to threats of the establishment, of a- countervailing 
duty by the importing countries. This situation revived the need for 
the prompt revis ion, in tfye,. appropriate, international forum, of the 
concept of export "subsidies" and "d is loya l " trade practices, ,.so that 
greater autonomy can,be-had in the application of express promotion 
po l i c i es in the developing countries. 
. L a s t l y , CAT encouraged the underinvoicing of exports and 
f i c t i t i ous -expor t s , ! / and dealings in transfer prices between subsidiary 
and parent, firms i,n the case of the transnational cprporations which 
led to i l l e g a l gains and real, costs to the Colombian economy. In 
particular, f i c t i t i o u s operations seemed to have reached considerable 
l eve l s in 1974.2/ 
• """I" V 1 
1/ When the di f ference in the price of the fore ign exchange in the 
para l le l o f f i c i a l market was lower than the CAT percentage, i t 
was pro f i tab le to e f f e c t f i c t i t i o u s exports and obtain in the 
para l le l ..market the fore ign puprenoy for the refund to the 
Banco de 1-a República. 
2/ The existence of those operations led, in part, to the padding 
Of export f igures. 
/ ( c ) Extension 
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( c ) Extension of the..JfejLleJp_Plan 
In spite of i t s complexity and the d i f f i c u l t y in i t s administration 
and control , the 'Va l l e jo Plan continued in force a f t e r the 1967 reform. 
Indeed, i t s operation was extended to three d i f f e r en t aspects1, namely, 
"replacement"/"multiple" and "clothing".1/ • 
The . f i r s t , by establishing the same franchises as the Va l l e jo 
Plan of 1959, allowed imports to be made to replace inputs which had 
been imported under the general• system-,; and̂  incorporated in-exported 
goods. The system o f fe red advantage^ to the enterprises which' were 
less sure of access to international markets, since' this would have 
made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r them to use the system"of import-export contracts. 
Owing to the nature of the me^haniisms used- in the "replacement" aspect, 
the incentive is' equal to exemption from half of the import tax?2/ 
in fact , two import opérations muèt be carried out, the f i r s t of which 
i s a f fected by taxes and the second i s exempt. ! 
The second mechanism provided import exemptions fo r the suppliers 
of intermediate goods to export processing i n d u s t r i e s i t s e f f e c t 
was to extend the scope of the import ¿xemptions and at the same time 
to eliminate the a r t i f i c i a l incentive to ve r t i ca l integration, of 
the l eve l of the f irm, i n the•production of exportable goods. In other 
words, the exemptions covered the imports of indirect components, in 
addition to the direct ones already covered by the Val le jo Plan. 
The third innovation permitted the clothing manufacturers to 
import raw'materials, without the right to the refund of foreign 
exchange, f o r re-export once manufactured; the CAT was granted, in 
this case, only on the value added. 
1/ Art ic les 179 and 173 of Decree^Law kkk/S7° 
2/ More correct ly i t s present value i s equal to half normal taxes 
less the cost of capi ta l , since they are paid once the f i r s t 
import operation i s completed, instead of being divided between 
both operations. 
In this case the import-expiort contract müßt be entered into 
by both the exporter and the producer of the intermediate goods. 
/ I t can 
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I t can be seen that the three systems expanded -the cover of 
import-export contracts, mitigating, nevertheless, i t s negative 
features. In b r i e f , the f i r s t reduced the -risk whicH small or new 
enterprises with greater d i f f i c u l t y of access to external markets 
were facing; the second reduced the a r t i f i c i a l incentives to ve r t i ca l 
integration within the same enterprise of the procjuétion of export 
goods and inputs, and the third made the incentives to use imported 
components less a t t ract ive , l imit ing the concession of the CAT to the 
value added by the exporter.. 
(d) -PROEXPO; marketing and financing policies 
> • The establishment of PROEXPO constituted an e f f o r t to apply a 
more integrated promotion pol icy.1/ The functions granted to the.new 
•body attempted to provide "external economies" ; for exporters, by 
providing them with information on foreign markets, technical advisory 
services on transport, packaging, and quality control, and the direct 
promotion of sales of Colombian products abroad, through the 
:appointment of commercial attaches, the help of missions, and the 
organization of international fairs. , In addition, PROEXPO was made 
responsible fo r the control and administration of export insurance. 
In general, these functions f i l l an,existing gap1in this'connexipn. . 
In the poorly competitive, unstable,, and heterogeneous international 
market, the'• costs of making national ...products known abroad, and of 
se lect ing and studying spec i f i c foreign markets helped to pinpoint 
export opportunities, which were d i f f i c u l t f o r each potential exporter 
to detect. Lastly, i t should be. mentioned that a f t e r the establishment 
of PROEXPO, the procedures required for-exports were s impl i f ied and 
rat ional ized thereby drast ica l ly reducing the number of public 
inst i tut ions involved in the operation. Although the progress made 
1/ The Fund was established by Decree-Law kkk of 1967. I t s status, 
according to decree 1175 of June 19761 i s that of an autonomous 
jur id ica l person attached to the Banco de la República» I t i s 
defined as a public enterprise having the same functions as a 
¡credit inst i tut ion« 
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appears to have been considerable, there are s t i l l some problems which 
a f f e c t mainly the small enterprises and those located outside of 
Bogota»!/ 
The main ac t i v i t y undertaken by PROEXPO seems to have been 
concentrated on the provision of credi t . This function has provided 
an important incentive, owing to the tradi t ional scarcity of working 
capital characteristic of the Colombian economy.2/ Furthermore, the 
f a c i l i t y of access to credit has been accompanied by preferent ia l 
interest rates:, this, therefore, constituted a further means of 
subsidizing exports. 
The credit ac t i v i t y of PROEXPO o f f s e t in part the impact which 
the changes experienced in 1973 in the "advance refund" system had 
on the ava i l ab i l i t y of working capital . This system acquired greater 
importance from 1967 onwards. During d i f f i c u l t years in the external 
sector, i t s operation helped to attradt external credit which was 
used to strengthen the exchange balance. However, in 1972 there was 
a l u l l in the external sector, a sharp expansion in domestic economic 
ac t i v i t y , and a marked increase in the money supply. In view of the 
des i rab i l i ty of regulating'domestic l i qu id i t y , and since-international 
reserves had reached, a sat is factory l e v e l , the Monetary Board proceeded 
to modify the advance refund system. At the beginning of 1973 i t 
decided that redemption would take place at the rate of exchange in 
force on the day of the advance. In this way, the impl ic i t subsidy 
in the system then in force was eliminated, whereas the exporters 
right to contract external debts was maintained and the rate of exchange 
was f ixed at the time of the advance refund. However, the e f f e c t s of 
1/ See M, Martinez, op. c i t . 
2/ For example, exporters speak of a scarcity of working capital 
as one of the main constraints on the production of exportable 
goods. This i s s t i l l so even in 1973, as i s shown by a purvey 
of exporters which shows this variable as one of the most 
frequent constraint. See Manuel Martínez, "Obstáculos al des-
arro l lo de exportaciones manufacturadas", Fedesarrollo, 1973. 
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these, measures proved insuf f i c i ent from the monetary point of v iew. l/ 
In August of the same-year the Monetary Board prohibited advance 
refunds, expanding instead the l ines of credit of PR0EXP0. As a 
result of th is , one source of issue was replaced" by another. 
Nevertheless, the new. form of issue was open to greater control, 
since i t depended' on the amount of the l ines of credit which PR0EXP0 
received». Furthermore, i t put an end to the large-short-term external 
debt, which was potent ia l ly very dangerous and c lear ly inconvenient 
at times when there . itfas. a surplus in the balance of payments. 
Lastly, among the a c t i v i t i e s undertaken by PR0EXP0, i t implemented 
a system of export credit guarantee.2/ This was'^realized; through 
a group of private national insurance companies, the insurance covered 
commercial, p o l i t i c a l , and extraordinary r isks. The Fund assumed the 
r i sk fo r government measures, which prevented the transfer of credit 
in the currency agreed upon.or made .such currency inconvertible," 
general moratoria, catastrophes, or measures taken by the Colombian 
Government which prevented the exporter from performing his contract 
to de l i ver . The insurance company, fo r i t s part, assumed the 
commercial:risks. The proportion of loss covered was 80 per cent and 
75 per cent respect ive ly . The volume of exports covered in practice 
vras r e la t i ve l y small. More than half of the minor• exports during:the 
period were sold fo r cash and another part under irrevocable credi t , 
therefore no insurance was required. There i s no doubt that i t s 
major importance l i e s in the incentives i t provides for new exports 
of manufactured products for the markets of the developing countries» 
1/ The easy situation in the balance of payments f a c i l i t a t ed the 
procurement of external credit , the e f f o r t s to tighten domestic 
• credit forced exporters to seek i t s replacement abroad and, 
- l a s t l y , a slow readjustment in exchange rates made i t cheaper 
. to contract debts, abroad. 
2/ The legal ' authority fo r establishing the system was granted by 
Decree Law Wl-. of 1967» 
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(e) The Andean Pactj^ negotiated access 
During the course of this subperiod the main negotiation by 
Colombia'to expand the access of i t s products to external markets 
was completed» In fac t , in 1969 i t signed the Cartagena Agreement, 
which in i t ia ted the integrat ion process of the countries making up 
the Andean sub-region. In 1976, the reciprocal trade of more than 
one half of the Andean Tar i f f area i s subject to taxes which are lower 
by 50 per cent or more than those which prevailed in 1969.1/ The 
simple average rate i s approximately 22'per cent. 
The gradual elimination of the barriers to reciprocal trade, 
which at present covers approximately 3,000 t a r i f f positions, together 
with the gradual adoption by the member countries of the minimum 
common external t a r i f f (AEMC), gradually created a margin of 
preference for a number of goods produced in the sub-region. The' 
average rate of the' common t a r i f f i s 40 pep cent, which would mean that 
in 1976 there would be an average margin of preference of l8 per 
cent. In practice, however, i t i s necessary to qual i fy this 
calculation. On one hand, i t i s only a common minimum t a r i f f , and 
therefore the countries apply higher rates to many items. Furthermore, 
there are various customs exemptions \irhich mean that the common t a r i f f 
does not apply across the board; equally., each country can exclude 
from i t s l ibera l i sa t ion programme a certain number of items, which 
means that they cannot enjoy preferent ia l treatment in other Andean 
markets. The combined e f f e c t of these special situations seem to 
imply that the real preference margins show lower averages than 
the theoret ical one. 
The foregoing analysis shows that Colombian exports would enjoy 
a preference margin in Andean markets. In other words, they would 
receive an incentive because of this, since they would be able to be 
placed at higher prices than they would get in international markets, 
a feature common to reciprocal trade protected by margins of preference 
in any economic integration system.. : * 
1/ See Augusto Aninat, "El programa de l iberación y el Arancel 
Externo Común Andino", mimeo, CINDA, 1975» 
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In view of the introduction of the incentives mentioned, those 
which were in force previously in the export promotion system., should 
be revised., The common rules governing national incentives for 
intra-subregional exports are s t i l l not being applied, and i t i s 
for this reason that each member country has been able to maintain 
i t s prevai l ing system«, In fac t , the Government of Colombia has 
maintained for exports to the Andean sub-region the same incentives 
i t grants to those being exported to third countries» The overlapping 
as the result of the additional incentive provided by the margins 
of preferences has contributed to the rapid growth in Colombian 
exports, part icularly manufactures,1/ to countries members of the 
Cartagena Agreement during the closing years of the subperiod. 
In sum, from 1967 onwards export pol icy was transformed into.a 
promotion system which covered d i f f e rent facets , thus acquiring a 
more integrated character. The speci f ic po l i c i es , part icularly the 
exchange policy and the CAT, displayed, much greater s t ab i l i t y , being-, 
supplemented, in addition, by direct promotion actions through 
PROEXPQ» Final ly , in the last years of the decade the Cartagena 
Agreement was signed, which gave an added impulse to the placement 
of Colombian products in Adeah countries. 
ko The rev is ion of the system as from 197^ ,; 
The export promotion systfem underwent major changes towards the 
end of ,197^, with the introduction of the" Economic Emergency Programme 
implemented by the government of President Lopez Michelsen» The 
changes in this f i e l d attempted to eliminate some of the c r i t i c a l 
aspects of the exist ing po l icy . These can be summed up in three points: 
the reduction of the f inancial burden' which this meant f o r the government, 
1/ Other:essential machinery of the Cartagena Agreement, such as 
the sectoral industrial development programmes (PSDI) have been 
slower in having an impact, since, in general, they ca l l f o r new 
investment. Hoivever, the i n i t i a l trade flows corresponding to . 
t h e . f i r s t PSDI', covering the machinery and metal products sector, 
on which agreement was reached in August 1972, were already 
noted in 197^. 
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the increase in the se l ec t i v i t y of the system., and the activation of 
the exchange pol icy» In turn, i t s revision.took place in the context 
of the development strategy outlined by the new government., Thus, an 
attempt was made to ensure.that the,form taken, by export promotion 
would support or be..compatible with /the various strategic object ives 
of the government«1/ Among them mention should be made of the 
generation of a greater number of,employment .opportunities and the 
geographical decentralization of productive act iv i t ies. , 
(a ) Fiscal r e l i e f and the selective, reduction of the, rates under the 
CAT and the Val le jo Plan 
The f inancial burden born by the Government had grown rapidly 
between 196? and 1974. -This was due to the mult ip l ic i ty of incentives 
granted together with the expansion of the value of minor exports. 
The high l eve l of public expenditure in the form of incentives to 
exports recorded at the end of the previous subperiod - which in the 
case of the CAT amounted to the equivalent of 8 per cent of tota l tax 
revenue =• explains the concern produced in various sectors as regards 
the f i s ca l cost of the promotion system.2/ Furthermore, some of the 
more important de f ic ienc ies or shortcomings of the exist ing promotions 
system became more obvious. 
The measures designed to reduce the burden for the government 
were quickly adopted. On one hand, the rate of the CAT was reduced 
f o r a l l exports to l eve l s ranging from 7 per cent to 1 per thousand. 




See Departamento Nacional de Planéaci&n, Para cerrar la brecha: 
Bogota, 1975» and Rodrigo Botero Montoya, La Po l i t i ca Econòmica 
Colombiana, a statement by the Minister of Finance at the meeting 
of the Consultative Group in Paris, 23 June 1975» . 
In the document presented to the Third Meeting of the Directors 
of Export Promotion of the Andean Group ent i t led ; IObjetivos y 
metas de la promoción de exportaciones" (JUN/RD;PE/III/di.5, of 
9 September 1975, Cartagena Agreement), i t i s pointed out that 
i f the former percentage of 15 per cent had been paid, the f i s c a l 
cost of CAT for minor exports would have been 120 mil l ion dol lars 
instead of GOO mil l ion. The new system reduces the subsidy to 
approximately 25 mil l ion dollars per year. 
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incentive had been previously reduced and to agricultural products 
in which exports were creating problems for domestic supply»1/ The 
rate of 7 per cent was established for most agricultural exports,2/ 
whereasmost manufactures were subject to a CAT of 5 per cent. Under 
exist ing l eg i s la t i on , although the measure was adopted in September, 
i t only came into force fo r shipments e f f ec ted from 1975 onwards. 
Furthermore, the holding period of the c e r t i f i c a t e s was increased to 
11 months. Lastly, the benef i t was granted exclusively on the value 
added, in respect of exports covered by the customs exemptions under 
the Vai le jo Plan. ' 
The f i s c a l savings expected from the application of the new 
provisions, were long in material izing due to the delay between.its 
adoption and i t s coming into e f f e c t . The result was that in spite 
of the fact that there was a drastic f a l l in the value of the 
c e r t i f i ca t es (CAT) issued ( in c irculat ion) during 1975, the value of . 
the c e r t i f i ca t es used (redeemed) increased during the year. The to ta l 
value of the l a t t e r i s what excercises the impact on the f i s ca l funds, 
since i t i s at the time of redemption that they are used as credit 
for the tax debts of their holders. I t was only in 1976 that there 
was some e f f e c t i v e f i s c a l savings. 
The se l e c t i v i t y of the CAT system was increased in various ways, 
thereby making a better contribution to the development of the rest 
of the economy. The f i r s t of these was, as pointed out, by granting 
the CAT on the value added generated by exporters covered by the^ 
1/ The export of several of these products was subject to 
restr ic t ions, as a result of which the reduction of the CAT 
had a ^d i s t r i bu t i v e e f f e c t rather than an a l locat i ve one. 
2/ The discount of 2, points which was set -aside f o r the Colombian 
*. Agricultural Inst i tute was maintained to finance support to small 
farmers. Therefore, the net rate f e l l from 15 to 5 per cent. 
J/ Modifications must be e f fected before the 1st of October of each 
year to come into e f f e c t on the f i r s t ; o f January o f ' the fol lowing 
year, in accordance with Ar t i c l e 171 of Decree-Law kkk of 1967. 
Due to the degree of the reduction of the CAT and to•t&e, extension 
of the holding period, shipments were advanced so that' they would 
be recorded before the end of the year. 
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Val l e jo Plan, which meant the elimination of the duplication of 
benef i ts \tfhich they were s t i l l receiving; as a result , the incentive 
to use imported components was reduced. The e f f e c t i v e protection 
received fo r each export covered by the Val le jo Plan, therefore, dropped 
in direct re lat ion to the use of foreign inputs. In addition, in 
order to enjoy the franchise o f fered by the Val le jo Plan, i t was made 
compulsory.that at least 50 per cent of the value of the export of 
goods should correspond to national value added„1/ Thirdlys the 
reduction in the rate of the CAT was also carried out in a se lect ive 
manner, placing exports which were given lower pr ior i ty in the lower 
category ( l per thousand). Lastly, the tax exemption enjoyed by 
the i n i t i a l holder of the CAT was replaced by a system of credit on 
income tax fo r the purpose of easing the e f f e c t of the existence of 
d i f f e rent rates, depending on the jur id ica l nature of the exporter, 
on the equivalent-subsidy of the CAT.2/ In this way, a l l the provisions 
are designed to reduce the future f i s ca l burden on a se lect ive basis, 
(b ) Intensif ied, incentives^^credit and exchange rates 
The measures described, apart from their greater s e l e c t i v i t y , 
meant a clear reduction in the incentives granted to exports under 
these systems. To o f f s e t this , the government decided to expand the 
credit f a c i l i t i e s channelled through PR0EXP0 and in the fol lowing 
months there was an increase in the readjustments in the exchange 
rate . The financing of the two compensating mechanisms does not imply 
any f i s ca l cost« 
With regard to credit f o r financing the longer resources required 
and the subsidies implied in the lower rate of interest paid by the 
bene f i c ia i r i es of such credi t , the rate of the special tax on imports 
was raised. This was done in two stages, f i r s t i t was raised to 
1/ In the case of the la te r Val le jo Plan i t amounts to 60 per 
cent. 
2f The new system consists in adding a par value of the CAT 
received by the exporter to his taxable income and he can 
subsequently deduct from the tax due a proportion of the CAT. 
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3.5 per cent and subsequently, in October 1975> it was raised by a 
further 5 per centjl/ it is for this reason that the import costs 
of goods subject to taxation increased. 
It can be seen that under this provision an incentive financed 
with general funds from the budget is replaced by one covered by 
a tax on imports.. The revenue from this tax is considerable, and 
it will, therefore, constitute an important source of financing for 
PROEXPO, if maintained. In 1975 it produced more than kO million 
dollars.2/ 
Most of the credit has continued to be directed to the provision 
of working capital. Although PROEXPO provided' the funds - from its 
own sources, from the Bank of the Republic, or from other finance 
organizations - the credit operations are generally carried out 
through the banking system. The maximum rate of interest paid by 
the exporter for placements in national currency is l8 per cent per 
year. In spite of the drop in the rate of inflation in 1975i real 
cost of these crédits was negative. Therefore, thé exporter who 
succeeded in having access to export credits received an incentive, 
through the real rate of negative interest, which is estimated to be 
equal to an average exchange rate of 3 to h per c e n t F u r t h e r m o r e , 
a little more than half of the less important exports were financed. 
1/ It should be borne in mind that this additional charge on the 
CIF value of imports is not applied to, among others, those 
imports covered by the Vallejo Plan. In order to avoid greater 
discrimination between inputs incorporated in export goods and 
those incorporated in goods consumed locally, the tax also had 
to cover1 the operations under the Vallejo Plan. 
2/ Revenue received was even higher in 1976, since the 5 P e r cent' 
rate was applied throughout the year. 
3/ The exporter receives funds equal to up to 80 per cent of the 
value of the goods. It is estimated that the average period of 
credit is approximately four months and that the nominal cost of 
capital to the exporter is Â- per cent per year. 
hj See PROEXPO, Fondo de Promoción de Exportaciones, Informe de 
Actividades, 1975, Bogotá, 1976. Of the minor exports, cotton, 
sugar and bananas did not have access to credit. 
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The strengthening of credit support for exports also had some 
selective features. In particular, substantial sums were set aside 
for exports affected by the economic recession in the developed 
countries. In this connexion, it is interesting to note that temporary 
support was provided in response to a conjunctural situation.!/ 
Products whose exports had expanded sharply in preceding years faced 
drastically depressed markets during 1975» In addition, special lines 
of credit, "machinery for temporary compensation" were established to 
provide relief in difficult situations resulting from the sharp drops 
in world prices and other temporary causes.2/ Lastly, during a period 
of difficulties in the balance of payments, the advance refunds system 
was re-opened, although for a limited number of products - textiles, 
cotton, beef, tobacco and bananas - at the same time, the external 
borrowing of export producing enterprises for financing working capital 
or investment was authorised for minimum periods of 5 years. When 
the balance-of-payments situation was corrected, this authorization, 
was suspended in March 1976. The export credit guarantee continued 
to operate, with an innovation^ under which PROEXPO began to cover 
50 per cent of the premium paid by the exporter.3/ Nevertheless, the 
use of insurance continued to be very limited» As is to be expected, 
the large majority of the policies cover credit for less than one year 
and mainly operations with countries of the Andean Pact and of 
Central America. 
The second promotion mechanism to which the Government attached 
importance was the exchange policy. With a view to cushioning the 
effects of the reduction of the CAT, exchange policy was given a more 
important role than in the past. In fact, an attempt was made to 
improve the real level of the rate of exchange, which resulted in a 
1/ The textile and clothing sectors were the main recipients of 
special credits. Both experienced a crisis in 1975 as a result 
of the economic recession in several developed countries. 
2/ Rice received compensation in the region of 7 per cent in 1976. 
Up to a maximum of 1.5 per cejit; of the amount insured. In 
addition, the proportion of losses resulting from political and 
extraordinary causes for which cove? could be obtained was 




more rapid increase in its rate, particularly during the last months 
of 19?U and the beginning of 1975. In fact, the price of the exchange 
certificates increased by 22 per cent during the first twelve.months 
in which this new system operated, and helped the real rate (adjusted 
for domestic and external inflation) to improve by approximately 
k per cent.l/ Nevertheless, there was subsequently a spectacular 
and continued increase in the price of coffee which generated .a rapid 
increase in international reserves and an expansion in the money supply 
which was higher than that desired by the Government. , As a result of 
this, the exchange adjustments were made smaller, thereby introducing 
a reversal, of the trend in real exchange rate in recent months.. 
Efforts to correct the situation include an agreement reached, 
in 1976 between the Government and coffee growers for the latter to 
invest their surplus income in bonds based on the,coffee exchange 
price of 1.20 dollars. The agreement is valid for 6 months. Although 
the result itself is not enough to promote stability in the economy, 
it represents a movement in the right direction in order to avoid the 
transfer towards the heart of the Colombian economy of the effects of 
the ups and downs in coffee prices, 
(c) Other promotion efforts 
Since 197^ several other efforts have been made to strengthen 
the export promotion system. Many of them„ however, are at the design 
stage or their implementation is still too limited to show any results. 
It is interesting to note that some Colombian exporting enterprises 
do not consider such an exchange policy to be in .their interest. 
There are two reasons for this; (i) devaluation raises the costs 
in terms of national currency of imported inputs although, 
obviously, it increases the value added in national currency; 
however, working capital is scarce and some enterprises- can-only 
obtain.it at high costs in informal markets; (ii) for an exporting 
enterprise who has current liabilities in foreign currency, an 
increase in the rate of exchange is not to their advantage; if these 
liabilities are substantial this negative factor for the enterprise 
could be more important than the positive impact of devaluation 
on the value added in exports. Such a situation is all the more 
likely to occur when the proportion of production exported is lower 
than sales in the domestic market.,, .-, 
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Mention should be made of an aspect which is of more importance 
for the future, namely, the recent preparation of an industrial design 
plan, for quality control, and packaging, 1/ and a study on the 
"exportable supply" for guiding the search for external markets. 
At another level, there are the incentives anounced in 1975 for 
enterprises installed in frontier areas. The incentive consists in 
the refund of a part of the contributions made to the social security 
system (SENA and the compensation funds) by the enterprise; these 
contributions are proportional to the payroll. The percentage 
refunded, ranging between 40 and 80 per cent, will depend on the 
proportion of the production destined for the external market. The 
machinery tends to operate in the correct direction for it promotes 
those enterprises with a larger payroll and those located in the 
frontier areas; nevertheless the incentive is a modest one because 
of the low incidence of social security rates.2/ 
Lastly, it should be mentioned that a system for approving 
export records was formalized. From the beginning of the decade the 
expansion of some exports had been raising problems of domestic supply. 
In response to this, case by case, limits to these exports were 
established. One of the problems which this process was designed to 
correct was the transfer to the domestic economy of the instability 
in various external markets, a. particularly marked feature in recent 
years.3/ At the beginning of 1975 tilth a view to organizing the 
system and reducing its casuistic nature, the Executive decided that 
1/ PEOEXPO "Plan nacional de diseño industrial, control de calidad, 
empaque y embalaje para industrias de exportación", Bogotá, 
August 1976. 
2/ See an account of other activities of PEOEXPO during 1975 in 
Informe de Actividades^ 1975, op. cit. 
Some of the Colombian export products showed features of marked 
instability in prices and volumes for domestic markets. See for 
example "El Idema y la política de comercialización de productos 




exports would fall into four categories,1/- namely; (i) those without 
special requirements; (ii) those which could be exported only by 
specialized producers or producers' agencies; (iii) those -for which 
the prior study of production'and domestic consumption carried out 
by government bodies was necessary, to be specified in each case; 
and (iv) those for which export was-, suspended» 
In brief, the policy introduced in 19.7̂  marked a sharp innovation 
in some aspects of the system introduced... in 1967«. The differences 
are in the form and intensity of. the use of the various domestic 
promotion instruments. In view- of the serious preoccupation caused 
by the fiscal impact on export promotion.indiscriminate incentives 
on the gross value of exports were, drastically reduced; the same 
occurred to a lesser extent as regards incentives which discriminated 
in favour of imported components. The pattern of change has been to 
shift, partially,, in the direction of providing incentives for national 
value-added with a certain dsgroe of preference for the employment 
contained in it. Furthermore, a part of the financial burden has been 
transferred .to imports, through a tax; in this way an.attempt has 
been made to increase the contribution of. the external sector to the 
budget. Finally, the exchange policy assumed an active role at the 
beginning; however, following the rise in the price of coffee, it 
once more became subject to the ups and downs in the price of that 
product. 
1/ Resolution 003, of the Consejo Directivo de Comercio Exterior 




ELEMENTS FOR A GLOBAL APPRAISAL OF PROMOTION POLICY 1/ 
1. Use of incentives and degree of promotion 
Promotion policies use fiscal resources which could be directed 
towards other activities or sectors of the economy. If the State has 
difficulties in obtaining additional fiscal revenue - either because 
there is a limit to the amount available, or where for reasons other 
than economic ones society dictates the size of the fiscal sector, or 
because the machinery for collecting revenue generates real costs for 
society when operating above certain levels - the distribution of 
scarce fiscal resources assumes enormous importance. It cannot be 
forgotten that if'the above assumption holds good, the true opportunity 
cost of fiscal resources directed to promotion is either "imposed 
inflation" with the economic and social costs that this generates, or 
the reduction in the share remaining for other public expenditure. 
The social cost of cutting down redistributive programmes, as 
necessary as those relating to expenditure on health, nutrition, 
education and housing, may well be considerable in developing countries 
with highly unequal-income structures. 
Tables 13, 14 and 15 contain information on the use of the 
three promotion incentives of greatest importance, apart from the 
exchange rate, in policies for promoting Colombian exports; the Tax 
Credit Certificate (Cèrtificado de Abono Tributario CAT), the import-
export systems known as the Vallejo Plan-, and the financing of minor 
exports by PEOEXPO or the Bank of the Republic. 
Table 13 shows the impact that the granting of the CAT had on 
fiscal revenue. Two aspects stand out immediately: (a) the rapid 
growth experienced in certificates issued: from 11 million dollars 
1/ This chapter is a first draft which needs improvement, and the 
information contained in it will have to be revised and completed 
in a later version. 
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at the beginning of the system in 1967 to 95 million dollars when it 
v/as drastically changed in 197^; and (b) the high level they recorded 
at their peak in 197^, when they represented 7 per cent of total 
current government revenue. 
Both facts are easily explained. The rate of growth of the CAT 
is no more than the reflection - since the rate remained constant 
during this period - of the impressive growth in minor exports in 
current values, and the level achieved is the direct result of its 
rate (15 per cent) and the base chosen for applying it (FOB value of 
minor exports). 
In Chapter III details were given of the changes introduced in 
the CAT in 197^, all of- which were in the right direction as regards 
its effects on the allocation of resources. From this fiscal point of 
view, these changes also represent a major advance as can be seen from 
the figure's of the CAT in circulation in 1975, which show some easing 
of the fiscal burden. 
It was the very success of the promotion system in general, and 
that of the CAT in particular which led to its drastic reform and 
virtual elimination, for'the fact: of linking a constant rate of such 
size to a variable which might, as it did, grow at exceptional rates, 
contained the germ of increasing fiscal balancing problems. 
The conclusion is clear: an important part of the promotion 
effort cannot be based permanently on an unchanging fiscal incentive, 
the axis (or base) should be instead the level of the rate of exchange, 
so that fiscal incentives would determine the variability in the degree 
of promotion but not its average level. Furthermore, the role of 
fiscal incentives is more important during the early stages of the 
export effort, when the need for a discriminating instrument is 
greater to offset the initial costs of the process, insofar as they 
generate external economies for export activities or for the country 
as a whole. 
/Trends in 
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Trends in imports liberalized under the Valiejo Plan, and: that 
of exports to which such imports- give .rise ..are. shown in table 14-. . . -
It can be seen from the table that: imports for this purpose .amount to 
a considerable sum, almost 80 million dollars in 1975, and that exports 
effected under this plan account for the largest share of. exports of 
manufactures» Prom these figures, and the details given in Chapter ,11.1, 
it can be seen "that the import ratio is higher .in respect; of exports 
affected under the Vallejo Plan than'"the average for productive 
activities in Colombia, which suggests that the Vallejo Plan, . 
particularly if operating in conjunction with the CAT, provides a 
greater incentive for those processes and. activities which.are more 
import-component intensive, •• 
Lastly, table 15 provides some figures which indicate the special 
financing received by minor exports. As explained above, the system 
of advance refunds was for a long period the m̂ain mechanism for 
financing exports, reaching in 1972 its peakof 230 million dollars. , 
From that point on the levels achieved began to fall, at the same time-
as the importance of PROEXPO's "provision-of finance.began to increase. 
Towards the end of 1975? this institution.maintained a balance of 
replacements of 160 million dollars; because of the rotation of these 
funds during:the year, PROEXPO, granted export credits amounting to 
approximately 420 million dollars; 
The limited development which has been characteristic of the 
Colombian capital market, and the beginning of financial-activities 
relating to minor exports made it necessary :to channel financial 
resources to these sectors through official'*institutions which guaranteed 
speedy access to credit. However, it must be pointed out that it was 
not necessary to provide an incentive through negative rates of 
interest in real terms, with their consequent,„harmful effects on. the 
economy as a whole. However, the extent to which this activity has 
grown, as v/ell as future plans v/hich may well, materialize in-view of 
the fact that-PROEXPO is accumulatinga substantive holding of resources 
from the 5 per'cent tax on imports, make it necessary tb reconsider the 
role being given to this institution in' official financial intermediation, 
in order to avoid negative side effects on the allocation of financial 
resources. ' /The effective 
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The effective exchange rate shows the overall degree of 
promotion for minor exports. This is obtained" tiy "adjusting the legal 
rate of exchange by the equivalent exchange rate of fiscal incentives, 
(CAT), imports (Vallejo Plan), arid financial onës (credit at ratés of 
interest lower than those prevailing in thè market). The first three 
columns of table 16 show, in nominal term's, (Colombian pesos per 
dollar for each year), the legal rate of 'exchange, the effective rate 
of exchange for manufactures (including the' Vallejo Plan incentive) 
and the effective rate of exchange for the remkiriing minor exports 
(not subject to the Vallejo Plan) for thè period betwèen 1952 ând 1975» 
The analysis cannot be niad'e in'terms of nominai "exchange rates 
since they do not take account of thè changes in the ratio of external 
prices to domestic prices, or of the different ràteis' of inflation " • 
abroad and in Colombia. The legal and effective fates of exchange 
must be calculated' in real terras. Two problems krise immediately: '' 
What external and internal pricë indexes must be used? In thisfstudy' 
we constructed an external pici ce index for Colombia;, using the! export 
price indexes of four countries which provide a substantial share of 
Colombian imports (United Statès, United Kingdom",' France and the 
Federal Republic of Germany), adjusting them by the'variations in1the 
rates of exchange of the pound sterling, the franc and the mark'' 
compared with the dollar." In this way the precise movement of the 
Colombian peso is obtained in real or parity terms. Although it is 
customary to deflate the rate of exchange by the consumer price' index, 
we believe that a more correct approach is to usé the wholesale price 
index since this does not include services which play no part in 
international trade. 
Table 16 contains all the necessary information. The first three 
columns show the legal and effective rate (adjusted by non-exchange 
incentives) in nominal terms. " Using thè export" price index referred to 
(column 9) and dividing by the index of the exchange rate (column 10) 
we get the external price index for Colombia (column 11). This''in 
turn is divided by the wholesale price index for Colombia (column 12) 
to obtain the ratio Of external to internal prices (column 13) which 
• /will be. ; • . 
will be used to convert the nominal rates'into real ones. Columns (4), 
(5) and- (6) contain, therefore, the real exchange rates, both the 
legal and effective ones in Colombia for a period of 23 years. 
These data shed light on one of the most controversial aspects 
of promotion policy in the last ten years^' In fact it is pointed 
out in Chapter.II that the period in which the greatest growth in 
minor exports occurred was that running from 1967 to 1971, and that 
although exports grew more rapidly in terms of current values, in the 
period 1971 to 1974 this growth was due rather to the acceleration in 
world inflation. In fact, during recent times the rates of growth in 
the export quantum fell, however, levels remained satisfactory compared 
with historical Colombian trends, and compared with those of other 
Latin American countries. Indeed, in table 16 it can be clearly seen 
that it was precisely in the year 1971 in which the degree Of promotion, 
measured on the basis of the effective rate of exchange in real terms, 
reached its peak, falling in the three subsequent years. This 
suggests a conclusion, which the following section will prove using 
more systematic econometric data, namely that the real effective rate 
of exchange has an important causal effect on the rate of growth of 
minor Colombian exports.' 
Furthermore, columns (7) and (8) show that the contribution of 
non-exchange incentives to the effective rate of exchange was 
increasing practically throughout the period, representing in 1967-1971 
approximately one-third of this rate for manufactures and a quarter 
for other minor exports. After 1971 this fraction begun to fall 
until in 1975» following the 1974 reforms, non-exchange incentives 
made up only 15 per cent of the effective rate for" manufactures and 
9, per cent of the same rate for other minor exports. 
In 1975, the legal rate, in real terms',1increased reaching its 
highest level in the period 1972-1975» The reforms to the promotion 
system introduced at the end of 1974 reduced the difference between 
the legal and the: effective rate, however, the latter increased 
slightly in spite of this. In other words, the structure of incentives 1 
/have changed, 
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have changed, non-exchange incentives being replaced by the rate of 
exchange, which i s a step in the r ight direction, and at the same time 
the degree of promotion increased. 
As the trends throughout the period of the exchange policy show, 
this seems to be subject to a certain degree of i n s t ab i l i t y which, 
although small in Latin American terms, i s su f f i c i en t l y high to provoke 
harmful e f f e c t s on the e f f i c i e n t growth of the Colombian external seetori 
There i s no doubt that f luctuations in the price of cof fee s t i l l 
inf luence, although to a lesser degree than before , trends in the rea l 
rate of exchange in Colombia. 
The adoption in 1969 of a programmed exchange rate policy with 
frequent minidevaluations represents the most outstanding advance in 
this respect. 
In f ac t , since the rate of exchange i s a var iable which a f f e c t s 
the price re lat ions of d i f f e rent goods, in ecpnomies which are a f fected 
by in f l a t i on , as in the case of Colombia and other Latir American 
countries, what i s important i s the rea l rate, in other words, that 
which i s suitably def lated by the internal and external in f l a t i on 
indexes, and not the nominal rate of exchange. I t i s fo r this reason 
that any policy designed to maintain f ixed nominal rates of exchange 
where internal i n f l a t i on i s higher than external i n f l a t i on in fact 
brings about a rea l revaluation in the exchange re lat ionship . This 
a f t e r a time leads to a balance of payments problem which makes a 
high discrete devaluation in the rate of exchange necessary, thereby 
creating negative e f f ec t s on in f l a t i on expectations and generating 
un just i f i ed capita l gains in certain sectors. 
A further problem of the managing of exchange policy in a country 
which depends to such an extent on the exports of a single product, for 
example co f fee , are the ups and downs in i t s pr ice . In f ac t , the 
f luctuations in the price' of co f fee , which have been high and frequent, 
lead, a l ternate ly , to d e f i c i t s and surpluses in the balance of payments. 
I f the rate of exchange i s used as an instrument of equilibrium in the 
short term, i t sets o f f f luctuating signals for the a l locat ion of 
resources in the economy thereby generating real costs, since there are 
/certain constraints 
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certain constraints in the productive activities and substantial ? ; 
costs- of adjustment. It is for this reason that , • rather..than 
variations-in the rateof exchange'as a means of solying short-term 
problems, financial solutions are required, such'as. ¡the..maintenance 
of certain levels of' international reserves*. or short-term: foreign 
debt, or the use of multilateral'machinery : for supporting the •. , 
balance of payments (common reserve funds, or "regional safety.: nets"). 
The latter without pre judice., of course, to all. the efforts-at .. 
international and domestic levels to obtain*a tiore stable; coffee 
price based on the long-term trend. • a*' '.•# . •<•?• 
The problem-would.,. therefore , be to define, what ,can be called 
a "normal price" or equilibrium price of coffee, so that an exchange 
policy could be followed which accumulates international" reserves 
when the price of coffee is higher than the equilibrium price, and 
which depletes reserves when this is lower. A more sophisticated 
policy might be called a "composed good", 'which consists of certain 
proportions - in accordance with their importance! in total exports 
at normal prices - of the most important products such as coffee, sugar, 
tobacco, bananas and cotton. Movements in the real exchange rate would 
only be used to correct major imbalances in the balance of payments, 
calculated on the basis of the normal prices of thé composed good and 
desirable levels of external debt and international reserves.1/. 
Similarly, these unexpected fluctuations in prices .cause 
problems of monetary management for the economic authority.,In"fact, 
by building up reserves, the .produce of their purchase of foreign 
exchange from exports, money is issued for this purpose. . To the extent 
1/ After a suitable definition has been made of a rate of exchange 
compatible with:thè normal- price o'f coffee, i't will be necessary 
to modify the nominal raté of exchange' on the . basis-: of .'changes 
in the relationship between the levels of extérnal and domestic 
prices. Here: thé problem is how to measure this ..relation 
adequately; in general, wholesale price indexes reflect more 
correctly variations in pertinent prices for determining the 
rate of exchange, since they do not include goods which are 
not traded in international markets such as services, construction 
work and transport. 
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that the instruments of monetary control are-defective, and there is 
difficulty in activating elements which control the money : supplyj the 
variations in the price of coffee will turn into, through the money • 
supply and the constraints of falling prices, inflationary pressures. 
Furthermore, the level of equilibrium in the rate of exchange 
also depends on the other economic policies. , When a change occurs 
in one of them it is necessary to seek the new equilibrium level for 
the former. Thus, for example, the introduction of a policy-of 
reduced tariffs calls for a higher rate, of exchange to balance the 
trade balance. It is then that real devaluations,, in the, rate of - ... 
exchange should and must occur, when other economic policies whiph;;. 
have a negative effect on the balance of payments are-changed.. 
2° The effectiveness of the jroftiotiOn policy ' : 1 
A number of econometric studies have been made on the sensitivity 
of Colombian Minor exports to variations in the effective exchange 
rate. Some of them only extend up to the period preceding the third 
phase of the promotion policy;1/ subsequently both Diaz-Alejandro and 
Teigeiro and Elson have studied its effectiveness. We shall single 
out their most important results. . . 
Diaz-Alejandro 2/ estimated the response of the supply of minor 
exports in relation to the effective exchange rate applicable to them.¿/ 
The dependent variable was the annual percentage change in the total 
1/ See John Sheahan-and Sara Clark, "The'Response of Colombian Exports 
to Variations in Effective Exchange Rates" (Research -
Memorandum NQ 11, Center for Economic Development, Williams 
College, June 196?) ; Leland L. Johnson, "The Question of. 
Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility in Colombia" (Research 
Memorandum NQ 55^5, United States.AID, August 1968) and, 
A. Urdinola and R. Mallon, op. cit., 
2/ See Carlos Diaz-Alejand-roop. cit. . . 
J5/ In this study, the effective .exchange rate is the. exchange 
rate corrected for differences in the growth of internal and 
external pri'ces, .taxes on minor exports (1959-1961) and 
subsidies granted through the taxation system. 
/value of 
- 89 -
value of.minor exports;]/ the main independent variables ;were thé level 
of the effective, exchange rate and an index of the stability of .the 
rate« In*the regressions, which cçver the period 1954-1970« he r 
obtained significant coefficients for -the exchange rate*.with .. 
elasticities ranging, between 0„74 and 1.05 (results.;similar to;thosè. 
obtained by other authors). He also found that exchange instability . 
has a definitely negative effect on minor, exports. '••• . 
He concludes that the .hypothesis that exchange rate policy had 
greatly affected minor exports is substantiated by more of the evidence 
than the opposite hypothesis, but he admits that it is difficult to 
assign to each economic policy variable responsibility for a precise 
part of the growth of minor exports. 
In a later study covering the period 1948-1951» Te.igeiro .and . •> 
Elson,2/ took into account in the calculation of the effective exchange 
rate not only tax payment certificates (CAT) but also the Vallejo Plan-
benefits and the special credit facilities corresponding to advance 
rebates. They also tried to differentiate between the effects of 
exchange rate variations on agricultural and on industrial: minor exports, 
and to assess the relative impact of each component, of the exports 
promotion system on the performance of minor exports.-
They found that the elasticity of minor exports with respect to 
the real effective exchange râte was approximately 1.3, which shows 
a strong response by the export sector to variations-in the- exchange 
rate.3/ Furthermore, after breaking down the various components of the 
1/ Diaz-Alejandro is aware of the problems stemming from the use of 
current values rather than indices of physical volume when the 
prices of minor exports have varied greatly. However, he was 
v unable to obtain indices of physical, volume', except for BAAT 
exports (bananas,rsugar, cotton and'tobacco) between 1958 and 
1969, for which he carried out regréssions between the quantum 
of exports and the effective exchange rate. 
2/ Teigei-ro and Elson, op. cit. 
3/ However, here again current values were used which may introduce 
an upward bias in the elasticity because of the behaviour of 
these variables during this period in Colombia. 
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effective exchange rate - legal exchange'ratefinancial value of 
fiscal incentives and, financial value of special credit facilities -
"the exchange rate i t.self,, appears. to,-be by far'the'"-most''important 
explanatory variable in terms of statistical significance".1/' With 
the introduction of a dummy variable to reflect the influencé of 
LAFTA on the growth of minor exports, the statistical results are 
substantially better and .the LAFTA-variable is highly significant. 
Finally, a study was made using quarterly data and distinguishing 
between exports of manufactures and agricultural minor exports. Ohce 
again the effective real exchange rate 2/ showed a high explanatory 
potential for both:.groups of minor exporté. 
All in all, economic theory, econometric results' and the 
judgements obtained from the survey on Colombian' e&porting"companies 3/ 
agree that Colombian minor•exports have a strong response to the level 
(in real terms) and stability of, the exchange ráte. ' The other fiscal, 
tariff and credit incentives which, can be translated into an exchange-
rate equivalent do have a;clearly discernible effect on the volume of 
exports, but not to the same extent• as the exchange rate itfeelf.' This 
may be explained by differing.expectations about the stability of such 
promotion policies and varying views of the real value of'the' various 
instruments concerned. , 
3'. Overall effects of the promotion policy 
(a) Allocation of resources 
The' policy of promoting import substitution made the Colombian 
export sector more vulnerable. This may be seen from the levels of 
effective protection granted to different sector's whose products are 
1/ Teigeiro and Elson, ,op. cit., p. 36'. In this regression they did 
not use the financial, value of the Vallejó Plan, which only 
applieé to exports of.manufactures. 
2/ Including the Vallejo Plan component for exports of manufactures. 
CEPAL-Bogotá, Encuesta a empresas exportadoras colombianas, 
August 1976. \ t . 
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saleable on the international market. Table 17 provides the figures .., 
for Colombia, including primary and manufacturing sectors in the 
year 1969: they were calculated by Hutcheson 1/ using two alternative 
methods outlined in economic literature. 
Estimating that in I969 the exchange rate would have to rise by 
per cent to balance the external sector if the structure of . 
protection were removed, Hutcheson maintains that any of the activities 
shown in table 17 with effective protection lower than 3k per cent 
were at a relative disadvantage, while the opposite was true of those 
which received higher effective protection. 
In his thorough study of the Colombian foreign trade régime,2/ 
which only goes as far as 1972, however, Diaz-Alejandro maintains that 
although the theoretical and empirical difficulty of this kind of . 
calculation are Well-known, it is clearly apparent that the variation 
in the protection granted to different sectors is very great. Not 
only was the manufacturing sector on the whole protected whereas the 
primary sector was not, but'it may also be seen that the protection 
varied considerably from one branch of activity to another. This 
suggests that the cost in domestic resources of generating one dollar 
has differed widely among branches and sectors of production, so that 
a promotion policy leading to some reduction of the variation in the 
structure of effective protection could have positive effects" on the 
allocation of resources in the Colombian economy. Hutcheson maintains 
that the structure of protection had a discernible effect on the pattern 
of growth in the industrial sector and that by over-favouring some .lines 
at the expense of others it has contributed to the slow growth of 
employment. . 
1/ T.L. Hutcheson, "Incentives for Industrialization in Colombia", 
Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973" 
2j C. Diaz-Alejandro, Foreign trade régime arid' economic development 
in Colombia, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1976. 
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Diaz-Alejandro lends perspective to his study by pointing out 
that activities with effective protection rates of over bO per cent 
accounted for only one-third of the value added (at domestic price's) 
in the manufacturing sector, or between 6 and.7 per cent of the gross 
domestic product, and that it is significant that a large,part of 
Colombian manufacturing industry operated at international prices. 
However,,, he lays, great stress on the inefficiency characteristic of 
the highly protected one-third, 1/ and the disturbing fact that the.-, 
proportion of investment in the. industrial sector which has been 
channelled to these branches is very high.2/ 
.The export promotion.policy has provided protection for the,,. . 
majority of exportable lines which were receiving negative effective 
protection. Thus a study of the effective, protection created by the 
tariff system and by the CAT \(Tax Payment Certificates) incentives and 
the Vallejo Plan for 105 products,, selected as potential exports by 
Colombia to member countries, of the Andean Pact,3/ indicates that in 
1970 all the groups, in which they were classified received negative, 
effective protection, when the effect of the tariff, system, alone was , 
considered. Table 18 shows the protection for sales within-Colombia, 
for exports without CAT or Vallejo Plan facilities, and for exports 
with the two incentives, in 1970. 
1/ He refers by name, to the petrochemical industry (especially 
pharmaceutical), the automobile industry, consumer durables 
like refrigerators and washing machines -r and artificial fibres. 
2/ D. Morawetz in "Import substitution, employment and foreign exchange 
in Colombia; no cheers, for petrochemicals" (mimeo, Harvard • 
Development Advisory Service, September 1972) argues that 
petrochemicals have received more government support'than any 
other industrial sector in. the 1960s - for example, 25, per cent 
of the total credit granted by the government's Fondo de Inversion 
Privado (FIP) - and that nevertheless it only generates 8 per cent 
of the industrial product. Furthermore, this sector is highly 
capital intensive - it is estimated that between 200,000 and 
300,000 dollars of investment are needed to create one job in 
this sector, so that its absorption of labour is much' lower than "" 
its share in the value added of the'industrial sector. 
3/ It should be recalled that the Andean integration machinery, with 
some exceptions, entered into operation,in 1972.. 
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The impact of these two incentives together on the level' ancl 
structure of effective protection for these' exportable line-s • is 
striking. Effective protection of' between minus 7 per cent-and • 
minus 150 per cent is turned into.positive protection:ranging from 
.25 to 58 per cent. The variation has declined and, recalling that 
Hutcheson estimated that the Colombian peso in. about this period was 
over-valued by 34 per cent, the range of:the levels of protection' 
becomes more similar to that of an equalization-compensation'policy.l/ 
In order to determine the efficiency of the policy, however, 
the structure of -protection must also be examined.2/ One important 
aspect is the relationship between the profile of protection and the 
labour intensity of the different productive sectors. ' Employment 
creation in the different productive sectors of the Colombian economy 
will be examined in the following section. -
(b) Employment 
A minor export promotion policy will contribute'; to the growth of 
employment to the .extent-: that it provides incentives for productive 
technology with a -higher labour use and for activities which are more 
labour intensive.. In other, words., the labour/capital" ratio can be 
changed through effects within and aftiong activities;, > 
The Colombian promotion policy until 1974 did not show any 
visible preference for-the use of machinery discriminating in'favour 
of technology and activities which generated greater employment within 
the exporting sector. On the contrary, it has already-been pointed out 
1/ See Chapter I. . . . , ...... 
2j Another fact that should be taken into.account in connexion with 
the desirable level of intervention' in'Colombian foreign trade 
is that, for geographical reasons,.Colombia is a country of 
open frontiers (land and sea). It is theréfore difficult to 
isolate the domestic from the international regime of relative 
prices, and an exaggerated attempt to do so'will produce a 
substantial flow of unregistered trade (according to some estimates, 
this flow has been .in the region of 100 million dollars in some 
years), particularly in certain goods (cattle, sugar, cement, etc.). 
The effects of these /trade flows on welfare and economic policy 
are discussed in J. Bhagwati, ed., Illegal transactions in 
international trade (North-rHolland, 1974). 
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that some of the incentives (Val le jo Plan, negative rea l interest rates ) 
even discriminated in favour of productive processes which were more 
intensive in the use o'f imported inputs and capital . ' 
However, the promotion policy provided a strong stimulus f o r 
exporting ac t iv i t i e s as a whole in comparison with other ac t iv i t i es 
and thus made a positive contribution to the absorption of both urban 
and rural unemployment. The industries capable of producing at 
international prices (at the e f fect ive exchange rate ) are precisely 
those where the employment generated by each unit of value added i s : 
greatest. Tables 19 and 20 provide estimates of employment and value 
added attr ibutable to exports. I t appears that i t i s precisely the 
most labour intensive sectors - text i l es and máde-up a r t i c l e s , food 
and also the basic metal industries - which contribute most to industr ia l 
exports. 
Income distr ibut ion, while not actually a goal of expdrt 
promotion policy, has been improved by i t through two e f f e c t s : 
(a ) these exports have reduced unemployment and raised the standard 
of l iv ing of the rural sectors ident i f iéd as c r i t i c a l areas in terms 
of extreme poverty and social depr ivat ion; !/ (b ) by"contributing to 
overcoming the chronic external disequilibrium which has absorbed the 
energies of the economic authorities for so long i t has freed resources, 
time and energy which may be devoted to solving1 the problems of 
income d i s t r i but ion . 2 / 
1/ In the case of Colombia various, theories seem to explain the 
pattern of trade. The Hecksher-Ohlin theories on the sale of 
the surplus and the cycle of the product are relevant, to 
understand the trade flows of speci f ic goods. I t i s therefore 
d i f f i c u l t to estimate the distr ibutive e f f ec ts in a context of 
general equilibrium. In this connexion, see the interesting 
stuby by C. Diaz-Alejandro, "Efectos de las exportaciones no 
. í tradicionales sobre la distribución del ingreso: e l caso 
.colombiano'", Estudios de Planif icación NS 50, CEPLAN, Universidad 
Católica de Chile, 1975» , ' ' " ' . 
2/ Another point we have not discussed because of a lack p.f time and 
information i s the role of transnational :companies in ..Colombian 
export trade and.their impact on the rate of growth and the 
destination of exports, the: e f fect iveness and e f f ic iency of 
. the ..promotion policy and on "income distr ibution among countries. 
-••'•• /k. Final 
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ko Final remarks v ' 
An outstanding feature of the Colombian economy i s the importance 
of the external sector, which represents about ?0 per cent of the 
national income and generates roughly a quarter of Government revenue. 
An export promotion policy with a rea l impact w i l l a f f e c t , .among other 
var iab les , the l eve l and rate of growth of the product» the f i s c a l 
situation and the leve l of employment. I t must therefore be coherent 
and compatible with the country's overal l development strategy. The 
Colombian promotion policy has been undergoing a process of continual 
improvement, in \i;hich each successive phase corrects some of the 
weaknesses of the previous one and adapts the policy to the new 
circumstances of the national and the world economy. 
The policy has unquestionably been e f f ec t i ve in the sense that i t 
has had a strong and c lear ly discernible impact on the leve l and 
structure of Colombian exports. The evidence given a l l points to the 
conclusion that i t has developed re la t ive ly e f f i c i en t l y and been 
designed and implemented taking into account the costs and benef i ts 
i t implies for the national economy. Natural ly, a l l this does not rule 
out a number of speci f ic instances in which i t could be improved so as 
to attain i t s objectives with minimal harmful s i de - e f f e c t s . 
Two aspects of the policy should be reviewed i f i t i s to continue 
to be a key element in Colombian economic development. 
In.the f i r s t place, we have mentioned the need for the system of 
incentives to be bu i l t around a suitable exchange rate to attain 
long-term equilibrium in the external sector of the Colombian economy. 
This w i l l minimize the f i s c a l cost of the policy and help to avoid 
f r i c t i on with importer countries on the problem of unfair trade 
practices. The system of d i f ferent iated incentives should have an 
important place in the policy since i t s role i s to make the policy 
se lect ive . However, the unsound argument to the e f f ec t that the 
policy should be selective so as to give further incentives to those 
ac t iv i t i e s which are ine f f i c i ent not only at market but also at socia l 
pr ices , which leads to a mistaken al location of resources and an 
a r t i f i c i a l competitiveness based on subsidies, should not be confused 
/with the 
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with the va l id argument recommending se lect iv i ty because discrepancies 
between socia l and market prices are-not in fact homogeneous among sectors 
and products. Preference should be given to encouraging those ¿i • •  
a c t i v i t i e s which generate more national value' added, employment', ^ 
technology and- other externa l i t ies inasmuch as the. market prices do 
not f u l l y r e f l e c t their socia l benef i t s . 
Secondly, po l ic ies on marketing, access and negotiation are : 
becoming increasingly important. Their role i s part icu lar ly 
s ign i f icant in the regional and. subregional integration probesses"' &rid'^ 
in international e f f o r t s fo r trade with other, developing countries* 
In turn, exporting successes crfeate f r i c t ions Which'should be smoothed 
out through negotiation,; While only a few products have met with 
problems of access to the markets of the developing countries 
- part icu lar ly text i les , " f lowers and. méat- and these rest r ic t ions 
have coincided" with the worst' recession in the industr ia l world since -
the 1930s, ho e f f o r t must be spared to avert possible problems in this 
f i e l d . Fears of; in s tab i l i t y of access on the part of' exporters 
- stemming from few but far-reaching measures - may be as damaging"'-
for the future of investment in export projects:' as' i n s t ab i l i t y i t s e l f 
The export promotion policy has'helped;to-overcome some-Of the' 
most serious problems of the- Colombian economy. I t ; ce r t a in l y can provide 
valuable lessons for the other countries of the region and; even for 
other developing countries which have recently undertaken-thé design 
and implementation of a dynamic export.strategy towards regional 
and world markets so as to step up the growth rate , ra ise the leve l 










" d o l l a r s ) 
Issued Redeemed 
Balanee 
1 to be re 
deemed 














(2 ) , • : (3) • :. :" (5)' , (6M3)/(5) 
1967 11»0 160 .0 0o0 
' : . , L 
l 6 0 , 0 7 294,7 0 . 0 
1968 20 sk 332.2 136.5 "* 355.6 " 8 85ß.3 1®5 
1969 .25.6 W . 6 331® 2 469.1 Ï1 249.1 2.9 
1970 27.3 505.0 • kzkoO 550.1 13 155.5 3.2 
1971 35.3 706 ,7 . , 5^3.2 713.6 16 651*5 3.3 
1972 . 53.3 1 169 .7 859*5 1 023.8 17 702.6 4.9 
1973 7^5 1 - 1 ^56»O 1 332.2 23 947.8 6.1 
1974 : 9^.5 2 ¡+7 ,̂9, 2 279«2 1 527.9 32 615.1 7.0 
1975 . 39.0 1 209.2 1 779.9 957.2 1*2 019«8 a/ 4.2 
Souroes; Column (2), Ban!; of the Republic, the issuing institution of the CAT; Column (3) Dire_o 
oidn General de Impusstosj Column (4) oorresponds to the difference between the aooujm 
lated value of columns (,2) and (3)} Column (l). is equal to eolumn (.2) divided by the 
annual average purchase price of the exohange oertifioatej Column (5) Bank of the Repub̂  




COLOMBIA: IMPORTS AND EXPORTS CARRIED OUT UNDER THE VALLEJO PUN, IJ6O-I975 
Year 
Imports Exports 
fllllions of US doli'are 
Import 
coeffloieret 








" ' . ' . ( I ) (2) (3) - W 
1360 0*1 0,1 100.0 • - 10,3 
1961 0.2 .. .0^2. '... 100,0; ' ... 13*3. 
1962 0.2 0,8 25.0: • \ 19.0 
1963 1 2e2 5.8 • 37.9 ' 20,5 < 
1964 '5.1 12,9 ••''•"'• 59.5 33.8 . 
1965 9.8 26.1 37.5- 4&.8 
1966 '•12.0 ¿6il . 47.0 
1967 ' 17 «0 41,9 40.6 . ^5.3 
1968 • 52.0 3W*-- 6i+#5 
1969 r 13.7 • : 61.5 • • 22.3 . '•. 75.o 
1970 24.7 58.1 4.2,5 75.1 . 
1971 26.6 • 6k.9 -• 4l»0 • 97*7 
1972 • 4O»5 .. ".' . 96.9; U1.8 ;''' H+3,7 
1973 M 17204. ' • . . : 37.6 % 243.4 
1974 s/ V y 
1975 79.6 228.3 34.9 
Sourosi Column ( l ) and (2) INCOMEX, on the basis of records} oolumn (4) on the basis of 
table 1. 
a/ Not available. 
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Teile 15 
' . CO LOMBI As SPECIAL FINANCING OP MINOR EXPORTS 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
I972 29.7 357.6-, 16.3 46.0 233.1 
1973 4.8 1 974.7 83.3 88 .1 146.3 
1974 2.9 2 491.2 . . 95.1 98.0 50.8 
1975 8.1 4 624.1 149.3 157.4 o> 
Sources; PROEXPO gild Bank of the Republic. The figures represent balanoes at ihe.end of eaoh 
year. Column (3) has been obtained by dividing oolumn ( 2 ) by-the-rate of exchange of 
minor exports, , • 
Table lé 
COLOMBIA: EFFECTIVE RATES OF EXCHANGE: 1952 TO 1975 
Nominal rates of exchange 
Efactive 









(Colombian pesos per dollar) 
(1) (2) (3) 
(Colombian pesos per 










(3) ' (13) 
Contribution of 
non-exohange incen- Export Rates External 
Whole-
sale Ratio of 













for ' ; 
Colombia 
















f l l )/( l2) 
0.00 0.00 75.4 99.0 76.2 ' I 8 . I 421.0 
0.00 0.00 • • Z H 99.0 If'6 I9.2 393.8 0.00 0.00 . 73-8 99.0 7».5. 2O.5 363,4 
0.00 0.00 99.0 75-3 20.8 362 .O 
0.00 0.00 i 76.8 99.0 . 77.6 22.9 338.9 
-o.o4 -o.o4 79.9 99.0 80.7 27.8 290.3 
-0.02 ' -0.02 ; 80.6 99.3 81.2 32.6 249.1 
-0.02 -0,02. • 80.6 99.9 . 80.7 35.7 226.1 
-0.02 -0.02 «1.6 - IOO.3 81.4 37.2 218.8 
O.28 0.18 82.9", IOO.3 82.7 39.6 208.8 
0.27 0.17 ; . £ 3 . 6 99.8 : 83.8 40.7 ; 205.9 
O.26 0.17 i 83.8 99.6 ' 84.1 51.4 . I63.6 
0.27 0.18 ' 84.7 99.6 ; 8 5 .O . : 6O.4 140.7 
0.30 Q.2'6 ; 86.9 9 9 .6 ; 67.2 65.3 . 133.5 
O.3O Q.19 ' 89.1 99.6 , 89.5 76.7 : 1 1 6 . 7 
O.33 0.22 • 90.9 99.7 • 91.2 82.O rj.ll. 2 
O.32 0.22 „ 9 1 . 8 , •,'100.0 . 91.1 8 7 . 1 : .104.6 
O.3O 0.20 94.7 ' 100 .7 : 94.0 92.9 . '101.2 
O.32 B . a ; 100.0 100.0' " 100.0 100.0 • 100.0 
O.34 0.23 : 1 0 3 .4 99.0 , io4,4 111.5 93.6 
O.3I 0.21 ; 106.1 97.2 1 0 9 .2 131.9 82.8 
0.25 0.16 120.9 93.7 129.0 168.7 76.5 
0.22 S.15 i 1 5 1 . 1 94.1 160.6 229.5 70.0 








































































































































































Source: Nominal effeotive rate; (a) between 1952 and 1971» Teigeiro and Elson, op. clt.. and (b) between 1^71 and 1975» National Planning Department,' Document, 
UPE-DEM, October 2 , 1975« Export Price and exohange rate indexes, International Financial Statistics. Wholesale prioe index and legal rate of exchange 
in Colombia: Review of the Banlc of the Republic. Colombian imports: DANE (Anuarlos de Comeroio Exterior). : ' 
Note: The external prices index for Colombia is calculated on the following basis: (a) the variation in prices of exports from: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Prance and the Federal Republic of Germany for each year were weighted on the basis of Colombia'3 imports from these souroes in each one of 
those years; (b) the same was done with the variations in the rate of exohange of the frano, mark and pound sterling with respect to the dollar. In 
both oases an external prioe index for Colombia (base 1970 5 100) was obtained by dividing the former by the latter. This index was used to reflate the 
nominal rate of exohange, for its subsequent deflation using the total wholesale price index for Colombia (the wholesale;prioe index of goods used and 




COMHBIAS EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION BY GROUPS OF TRADED SECTORS, 1%9 
(Percentages) 
Bai as sa Corden 
method . method 
Coffee . . . „ ... -45 . , .«»45 
Mining -8 -6 
Sugar, »23 «.19 
Primary, except coffee and mining 0 1 
Food products, except sugar 2 11 
Beverages ....... 121 103 
Tobaooo 95 • • 84 
Textiles 5 8 
Shoes «22 »-10 
Clothing 1+ - , 
Wood products -11 1 
Furniture - 25 - 1 1 
Paper products 12 14 
Leather products 11 " 1 6 
Rubber products - 3 1 - 26 
Chemical products 61 56 
Refinery products -5 ' 4 
Non-metallic mineral products -8 0 
Basic metals 151 39 
Metal manufacture 47 43 
Non-eleotrloal machinery -7 12 
Electrical apparatus a/ 668 
Transport equipment 610 313 
Diverse industries ' . " 117 ' 89 
All manufacturing 44 ' 29 
All manufacturing, except tobacco and beverages 40 25 
All manufacturing, except sugar .. . - 50 33 
Primary.exports, except coffee and mining 18 18 
Manufactured exports, except sugar 21 21 
Sources and method» Adapted from Table 3.5, p. 68, in Thomas L. Butoheson, "Incentives for 
Industrialization in Colombia", Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 
1973. The Corden measure is not affeoted by exchange rate adjustments made 
by Hutoheson. Given the assumptions made, the exchange rate adjustments 
influence the relationship between the prioes of traded and non-trade able 
goods. It will be recalled that the Corden method treats non-traded goods 
as if they were part of value added. The Balassa method results shown were 
made assuming a 34 percent exchange rate adjustment. 
NpteS This table has been reproduced from C, Diaz-AleJandre, op.clt. 
a/ Negative value added. 
- 102 -
Table 18 
- COLOMBO EFFECTIVE PROTECTION YIELDED BY TARIFFS AND EXPORT 
PROMOTION SCHEMES, ABOUT l^Q, FOR 105 PRODUCTS 
eroentage^ ̂  figures. to jgarentheses i show numb e ro f p rodu ct a ̂ ltiqluded ln^ each ̂ oate^ory ) 
For export 
For sale 
i n Without With 
Colombia promotion promotion 
schemes sohemes 
Foodstuffs, tobacco, and beverages (8) 198 -91 43 
Text i les (5) 267 -34 43 
Clothing (7) 287 -52 40 
Wood and wood produots (6) 120 - 7 1 38 
Paper and paper produots (7) 133 -67 47 
Printing and publishing (3) 79 -7 27 
Leather and leather produots (6) , 203 -1^9 53 
Rubber and rubber produots (2) 59 -36 .47 
Chemicals and petrochemicals (14) 49" -27 37 
Stone, earth, and olay produots (7) 97 - 9 25 
Metals and metal products (19) 101 - 39 ' 4o 
Nonelectrical tools and machinery (6) 33 - 1 7 •'""; 27 
Eleotr loal products and machinery (4) 57 -52 ; ' 52. 
Transport equipment (6) 59 - 3 0 38 
Others (5) 149 42 
Total (105) 130 •jiito* -M. -•••-• 21 
Source: Data summarized from unpublished oalculations of Gonzalo Glraldo, Planning Department,- . • 
Colombia. The sample of 105 manufactured produots was selected representative of actual or 
potential exports within the Andean Common Market, of which Colombia is a member. In .the 
calculation of effective protection, only tariffs and export promotion sohemes -were taken 
into aooount (see text). Input coefficients actually observed in Colombia,were used) imports 
of capital goods were excluded. An effective CAT of 20 per oent was assumed* a-.figure vhioh 
may be regarded as somewhat high for 1970. Special régimes exempting some imports from 
duties were disregarded for this oaloulation. . ; 
Note» This Table has been reproduced from C. Diaz - Alejandro. op.cit. 
Table 1? 
COLOMBIA* EMPLOYMENT AMD VALUE ADDED ATTIBUTABLE TO EXPORTS, BY BRANCH OP PRODUCTION, 1970 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 





generated per generated per 









.of pesos) .of pesos) of pesos) exports production added 
I . Industrial 
Food 2 280 723 482 023 723 119 7 43 2 1 570 3.26 10.28 
Meat 235 511 152 588 33 536 810 468 3.43 23.8 
OH 963 436 159 176" 172 375 1 555 266 1.61 9.0 
Sugar 555 032 99 088 289 687 2 750 511 4.95 9.5 
Shell fish 84 652 , 56 427 36 099 820 501 9.65 22.8 
Confeotionery, packed 441692 '. 14.744 .. 191 422 1 497 - 55 - .. .3.73 7-8 
Aniaal feeding - stuff. . » 
25 643 ' 19 "? 415 •' 1 659 - 3.88 ' I'ec.x'ts 42 C 010 8.3 
Beverages 
Halts- 215 425 880 36 730 181 1 .84 4.9 
Textiles 
4 852 297 352 218 2 191 311 27 609 2 004: . 5.69 " 12.6 
Clothing raid appavel 
Jackets, trousers, shirts, . . . 
gowns 286 343 3 l4o 152 572 2 961 95 . 10.35 . .' 19.5" 
Tanned hides , ; 
Leathers 525 092 70 667 171 836 2 544 336 4.84' ' 14.9 
Wood and -wood products 
Savmwood, furniture 182 687 49 747 90 660 1 450 493 7.92: 15.9 • 
Paper 
Paper, envelopes, cardboard -.1 314 297 126 577 412 967 ' 2 983 263 2.2 7 7.2 
Publishing 
Books 380 900 169 958 209 983 . 2 64j 315 6.95. 12.6 
Chemicals - 1 553 193 118 099 867 649 4 967 358 3.20 5.7 
Cheaicals . 592 224 70 861 297 44o 1 013 112 1.71 - . 3-4 
Others: paint, etc. 960 238 47 238 570 209 3 954 246 4.12 6.9 
Rubber .1 180 843- 64 602 565 426 6 421 379 . 5 . 4 4 II.36 
Rubber products: 'i'ires, Shoes 562 431 15 188 278 563 2 525 68 4.49 9.1 
Plastics 618 412 49 4l4 286 863 3 896 311 6.30 13.6 
Non-r.ietallio minerals 94O 621 164 947 564 720 5 983 904 6.3 6. 10-59 
Pottery, tiles 126 715 10 749 77 198 1 618 137 12.71 21.0 . 
Glass and glass articles 383 812 73 741 23O 845 2 522 485 6.57 10.6 
Cement 147 457 72 631 87 168 4 97 245 3.38 5.7 
Asbestos, concrete 282 637 7 826 1-61- 509 1 346 37 4.76 8 . 3 
Table I9 (concluded) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Value of Value of Value Erjployment 
Employment Emp1oyment 
generated per generated per 
million pesos million pesos 
of total of value 
production added 









Employment attribut-able to 
exports 
. Basic uetal industries 
Bars, sheets 237 1+69 10 656 91 740 912 41 3.85 9»9 
Metal products, Machinery 
and equipment 1 6OO 433 I60 050 , 982 119 . .10 852 1 139 6.78 11.05 
Tools, knives I9I 661 15 077 114 935 1 467 115 7,64 12.8 
Metal furniture and products 530 287 30 692 290 959 3 236 187 6.11 1 1 . 1 
Non-electrical machinery i4o 734 3 978 . 60 124 941 27 6.67 15.7 
Electrical machinery 59"+ 079 00 382 461 939 3 9?8 541 6.73 8.7 
Generators, transformers 79 900 21 300 28 469 775 207 9.69 2 6.7 
Professional and scientific 
equipment 34 537 6 290 12 421 262 48 7.48 21.8 
Other products n.e.s 29 235 2 331 13 272 173 14 5.96 13.3 
Subtotal industry 15 573 9̂ 9 1 739 248 7 069 210 77 115 8 208 .¿¿à 10.91 
I I . Agriculture -
Coffee 1*3 427 911 10 664 500 36 782 711 2 262 133 555 519 52.09 61.5 
I I I . Minig 1 
Petroleum and other minerals 4 505 512 1. 322 000 2 843 010 16 174 4 745 3»59 5»7 
IV. Servioes • » 
Shipping, tourisr.i, etc. 80 446 170 2 412 000 . 57 593 970 1 650 916 49 499 20.52 26.7 
Sources; DAIS, Tabulations of manufacturing industry« 
Matriz de Insumo Producto, 197o» 
IHCQMEX, Registros de Exportación, 197o» 
DNP. Inpacto de un aumento en el precio de los hidrocarburos sobre el nivel general de preoios de la Economía, UPG. Div» 
Progranas de Desarrollo, 1975» 
Cándelo R. Structural Change of "nploymentin Colombia, I95I-I968 (Master's Thesis). 
Distribución del Ingreso e Incentivos a la Exportación: CAT (Unpublished). 
Notes: Column 2: The value of exports in dollars ms estiuatedst a rate of $ 18*5- - . 
Column 5: It is assumed that employment to produce one unit is the sane as to export one unit of exported value» 
labia 20 
COLOMBIA: SECTORAL SHARES IN THE GENERATION OP EMPLOYMENT AND VALUE ADDED ATTRIBUTABLE TO EXPORTS, I97O 
Seotor 
Percentage 























Percentage Employment Employment 
of employ- generated generated 
ment attrij> per million per million 
utable to of total of value 
exports production added 






I . Industry 
Pood 14.6 10.34 9.9 # «5 22.9 3.30 10,3 .67 
Beverages 1.4 «5 .2 ol .01 .84 4.9 .02 
Textiles 31.2 30.99 35.8 19.7 24.4 5.69 12.6 .16 
Clothing 1,8 2.2 3.8 .5 1.2 10.35 19.5 .05 
Tanned hides 2,4 3.3 4.0 4.1 4084 14.9 .41 
Wood and wood produots 1.2 la4 lo9 2.8 6.0 7.92 15.9 .55 
Paper 8 „4 5*8 3.9 7.1 3 . 2 2.27 7* 2 .31 
Publishing 2c4 2.9 3.4 9.5 3.8 6*95 12.6 .80 
Chemicals 10.0 12.3 6.4 6.6 4.4 3o20 5.7 .14 
Rubber 7 . 6 7.9 8.3 3.4 4.6 5.44 11,36 . 1 1 
Non-metallio minerals 6«0 7«9 7.8 9.2 11.0 6.36 10.59 .29 
Basic metal industries 1.5 1.3 1 . 2 .6 .5 3.85 9.9 .12 
Metal produots, machinery and equipment 10,3 13.9 14.1 8.9 13.9 6.78 11.05 .16 
Total 100„0 100 „0 100.0 100 „0 100.0 -lúí 10,91 
lie Agriculture 
I I I « Mining 
.29 
«47 
M O vn 
Source: Table 19. 

